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TREATIES OF CONQUEST: PROPERTY RIGHTS, INDIAN
TREATIES, AND THE TREATY OF GUADALUPE
HIDALGO
CHRISTINE A. KLEIN*
I.

INTRODUCTION

All animals are equal
But some animals are more equal than others.
George Orwell'
The modern discourse concerning property rights has deep historical
roots, for property has long been the object of heated passion, war, and
conquest. Under our national lore, it is common knowledge that the
United States acquired from Native American tribes some two million
square miles of territory by conquest and by purchase. 2 Not as common
is the knowledge that the United States conquered Mexico in 1848 and
took over half its then-existing territory.' The states of California, Nevada,
and Utah, as well as portions of Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, and
Wyoming were carved out of that 529,000 square mile cession by the
Republic of Mexico. 4 In some areas of the southwestern United States,
the conquests overlapped. There, Indian lands were conquered sequentially
by Spain, Mexico, and the United States. 5 As the United States Supreme
Court acknowledged in retrospect, "Itihat there was tragedy, deception,
barbarity, and virtually every other vice known to man in the 300-year
history of the expansion of the original 13 Colonies into a Nation which
now embraces more than three million square miles and 50 States cannot
be denied." '6
* Associate Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law at Michigan State University; LL.M.,
Columbia University, 1994; J.D., University of Colorado, 1987. The author would like to thank
the staff of the Natural Resources Law Center at the University of Colorado for the support and
encouragement that helped to make this article possible.
1. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 123 (The New American Library 1956).
2. Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 36 (1947). See infra part II.A.
See generally RICHARD WHITE, IT'S YOUR MISFORTUNE AND NONE OF MY OWN: A HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN WEST 73-85, 320-23 (1991); Richard B. Collins, Indian Land, in 7 THOMPSON ON REAL
PROPERTY § 57.01, at 229 (David A. Thomas ed., 1994) (coercion and force were common in the
acquisition of Native American land by non-Indians).
3. J.J. Bowden, Spanish and Mexican Land Grants in the Southwest, 8 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 467, 468-70 (1973). CHARLES F. WILKINSON, THE AMERICAN WEST; A NARRATIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY
AND A STUDY IN REGIONALISM 7, 23 (Univ. Press of Colo. 1989). See infra part II(B).
4. Bowden, supra note 3, at 468-70.
5. See generally EDWARD H. SPICER, CYCLES OF CONQUEST, THE IMPACT OF SPAIN, MEXICO
AND THE UNITED STATES ON THE INDIANS OF THE SOUTHWEST 1533-1960 (1962).
6. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 437 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
See Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As
Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth"--How Long a Time is That?, 63 CAL.
L. REV. 601, 611 (1975) (discussing the abrogation of Indian treaties and concluding that the United
States' "ideals were often subservient to its ambitions when it came to honoring the solemn promises
contained in the treaties").
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In both cases, the territorial acquisitions were sealed by solemn and
idealistic treaties that belied the harsh realities of conquest. In exchange
for the transfer of land and sovereignty by Mexico, the United States
promised in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo that it would "inviolably
respect" the established private property rights of Mexican citizens in
the conquered territory and provide them with "guaranties equally ample
7
as if the same belonged to the citizens of the United States." Indian
tribes, in turn, relinquished large tracts of land in exchange for financial
compensation' and treaty guarantees that smaller "reservations" of land
would be maintained as homelands for the tribes. 9 But, as this article
will show, all treaty promises are not equal. As Orwell reminds us,
context and interpretation cannot be ignored.
This article traces the historical and legal currents that affected the
implementation of the treaty guarantees contained in the Indian and
Mexican treaties. In general, the treaty-based property rights of Native
Americans have been given an extra measure of protection not applicable
to property in the former Mexican territory. This extra protection has
evolved, for the most part, from Chief Justice Marshall's conception of
Indian tribes as dependent sovereigns entitled to the guardianship of the
United States.' 0 That trust duty has spawned a number of other legal
protections, including the canons of construction," the federal obligation2
to provide compensation for the taking of certain treaty-protected lands,
and-perhaps most importantly-a prohibition against the transfer of
3
Indian tribal lands to non-Indians without federal approval.
Hispanic lands, in contrast, represent more "garden variety" property
rights, freely transferable to non-Hispanics and not subject to any particular federal oversight. The beneficiaries of the Treaty of Guadalupe

7. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits and Settlement, February 2, 1848, U.S.-Mex., art. VIII,
9 Stat. 922, 929 [hereinafter Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.] "In the said territories, property of
every kind, now belonging to Mexicans, not established there, shall be inviolably respected." Id.
International law, too, suggests that private property rights should remain" intact following a conquest.
See, e.g., Ely v. United States, 171 U.S. 220, 223 (1898) ("[I1n harmony with the rules of international
law, as well as with the terms of the treaties of cession, the change of sovereignty should work
no change in respect to rights and titles."); Strother v. Lucas, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 410, 438 (1838)
("A cession of territory is never understood to be a cession of the property of the inhabitants.
The king cedes only that which belongs to him; lands he had previously grante[d], were not his
to cede." (citation omitted)).
8. See infra part II.A.
9. An 1828 treaty with the Cherokee Nation, for example, guaranteed that Indians who relinquished lands in the eastern United States and migrated westward would be there given,
a permanent home, . . . which shall, under the most solemn guarantee of the United
States, be, and remain, theirs forever-a home that shall never, in all future time,
be embarrassed by having extended around it the lines . . . of a Territory or State,
nor be pressed upon by the extension, in any way, of any of the limits of any
existing Territory or State ....
Treaty with the Cherokees West of the Mississippi, May 6, 1828, 7 Stat. 311, Preamble (quoted
in FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 80 (1982 ed.) [hereinafter COHEN]).
10. See infra part III.A.
11. See infra part IV.B.2.
12. See infra note 80.
13. See infra part VII.B.
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Hidalgo, moreover, are simply individual members of Hispanic communities, rather than a collective unit to which sovereign status has been
attributed. Overall, however, this observation that Native American treaty
rights were given special protection must be tempered by the realization
that both groups of conquered peoples were subjected to numerous
violations of their treaty rights. Indian lands were vulnerable to many
of the same corrosive forces that affected Mexican property rights.14
Legal commentators have tended to study conquests in isolation from
one another. After the first American conquest-involving Indian landsChief Justice Marshall announced that the relationship between the federal
government and Indian tribes is unique. 5 The profession has taken that
statement to heart, declining to consult Indian law as even a rough guide
for the resolution of conflicts originating in subsequent conquests., 6 Scholars in other fields, however, have begun to see value in a more comprehensive approach toward conquest. For example, one historian calls
for studies in "comparative conquests" to "help knit the fragmented
history of the planet back together.' ' 7
This article is an attempt to answer that call from a legal perspective.
A secondary goal is to provide an extensive analysis of selected legal
topics involving the treaty-based land rights of former Mexican citizens
in the conquered territory. Such scholarship is in its infancy, particularly
when compared to the wealth of the existing literature on Indian treaty
rights. 8 Finally, this comparison of treaty-based property rights is offered
to illuminate the choices that were made by the Supreme Court and
Congress by juxtaposing two sets of answers to a similar set of problems. 19
The contrast will show the country at both its best and its worst. Armed
with such knowledge, hopefully, the nation will live up to its highest
potential in future treaty-based conflicts.2 0

14. For a discussion of the non-enforcement of Indian treaties, including instances of nonratification, bribery, abrogation, and breach, see COHEN, supra note 9, at 63-64.
15. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17-18 (1831). See also Cherokee Nation
discussion, infra part III.A.
16. One commentator writes that, "[pirecise analogies [to Indian law] within the domestic law
of the United States are risky. Don't try. Indian tribes are not 'like' Puerto Rico, or the District
of Columbia, or Guam, or Alaska before it became a state, or Lithuania, or Kuwait, or France,
or Grenada." Robert Laurence, A Quincentennial Essay on Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 28
IDAHO L. REV. 307, 311 (1992).
17. PATRICIA NELSON LIMERICK, THE LEGACY OF CONQUEST, THE UNBROKEN PAST OF THE AMERICAN
WEST 26-28 (1987) ("Conquest forms the historical bedrock of the whole nation, and the American
West is a preeminent case study in conquest and its consequences.").
18. See, e.g., Introduction, LAND, WATER, AND CULTURE, PERSPECTIVES ON HISPANIC LAND
GRANTS 4-9 (Charles L. Briggs & John R. Van Ness eds., 1987) [hereinafter LAND, WATER AND
CULTURE] WIiscussing the inadequacy of the existing literature on land grants and describing the
need for future studies).
19. Indian law scholar Felix Cohen asserts that "juxtapositions can teach us about our national
character." COHEN, supra note 9, at 49-50 (advocating the study of Indian law from a broad-based
historical perspective).
20. Treaty conflicts are not simply a relic of the past, but have left "a legacy of bitterness"
under which neither Hispanics nor Native Americans have "given up the struggle to reclaim the
land they believe is rightfully theirs." See LAND, WATER AND CULTURE, supra note 18, at 4; Robert
J. Rosenbaum & Robert W. Larson, Mexican Resistance to the Expropriation of Grant Lands in
New Mexico, in LAND, WATER AND CULTURE, supra note 18, at 269; Robert V. Urias, Comment,
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Part II of this article establishes the historical and legal background

relevant to an understanding of Indian treaties and of the Treaty of

Guadalupe Hidalgo. Part III discusses the legal theory primarily responsible for the divergent legal status of Indian and former Mexican lands:
the federal trust duty toward Native American tribes. The following four
sections examine in detail the legal implementation of treaty guarantees
with respect to private property rights. Part IV analyzes the diminishment
of treaty promises by subsequent federal legislation. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was not regarded by the United States Supreme Court as
self-executing. Therefore, the passage of increasingly rigid implementing
legislation lead to the dilution of treaty guarantees. The promises made
in Indian treaties experienced a similar weakening under the plenary
power doctrine and through statutory abrogation of treaties. Those forces
were counteracted to some extent, however, by judicially-created canons

of construction that promoted the interpretation of treaties in the Indians'

favor. Parts V and VI consider the degree to which communal ownership
of land and watercourses, respectively, was recognized by the United
States. In general, common tribal ownership of uplands, but not submerged lands, was protected by treaty. The situation was reversed, however, with respect to the territory acquired under the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo. Finally, part VII studies the extent to which the federal government protects treaty lands from state and private interference. Under
the federal trust duty, Indian lands received considerable insulation from
outside forces. A much more limited degree of protection was afforded

former Mexican lands.
HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND OF THE
TREATIES
Despite the fundamental similarity of conquest, the ultimate fate of
Mexican and Native American property rights was influenced by a host
II.

The Tierra Amarilla Grant, Reies Tijerina, and the Courthouse Raid, 16 CHICAN O-LATINO L. REV.
141 (1995). Both groups have maintained cultural enclaves. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN
INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 120-22 (1987) (envisioning Indian reservations as "workable islands
of Indianness within the larger society"); Sylvia Rodriguez, Land, Water, and Ethnic Identity in
Taos, in LAND, WATER AND CULTURE, supra note 18, at 313-14 (land issues dating from the United
States' conquest of Mexico remain "an immediate and volatile issue rooted in everyday life" in
rural Hispanic communities in northern New Mexico and southern Colorado).
Alleged treaty violations continue to generate litigation. See, e.g., Hagen v. Utah, 114 S. Ct. 958
(1994) (tribe alleges that Congress did not intend to diminish Indian reservation by subsequent
legislation); Alliance of Descendants of Texas Land Grants v. United States, 27 Cl. Ct. 837 (1993)
(plaintiffs seek compensation for the taking of approximately 12 million acres of land in southern
Texas, based in part upon property guarantees contained in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo);
United States v. Norris, 967 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1992) (unpublished decision) (appellant alleges that
police search violated the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, as incorporated by the Gadsden Treaty);
Havasupai Tribe v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 1471 (D. Ariz. 1990) (plaintiffs allege that Forest
Service plan violates the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo); United States ex rel. Zuni Tribe v. Platt,
730 F. Supp. 318 (D. Ariz. 1990) (plaintiffs allege that the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo supports
their claim to an easement across private land) (discussed in infra part V.C.); United States v.
Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. 1301 (D.N.M. 1986) (plaintiffs allege that Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
protects their religious freedom and exempts them from certain provisions of the Bald Eagle Protection
Act); Asociacion de Reclamantes v. United Mexican States, 561 F. Supp. 1190 (D.D.C. 1983)
(plaintiffs seek compensation from Mexico for alleged taking of certain claims relating to land
grants).
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of circumstances unique to each group. This section will examine the
historical and legal backdrop against which treaty promises must be
measured.
A.

Treaties with Native American Tribes
Over five hundred years ago when European explorers first "discovered"
the New World, they found a land that had been occupied by aboriginal
peoples since "time immemorial. "21 In its struggle to define the parameters
of these native land rights, the United States Supreme Court formulated
a policy that is a striking mix of pragmatism, racism, and idealism.
In 1823 when the Court squarely addressed the nature of Indian title
in Johnson v. M'Intosh,22 European colonization of the Americas had
been underway for more than three hundred years. 23 The Court recognized
the practical need to incorporate "the actual state of things ' 24 into the
law-that is, to provide a legal justification for past and future acquisition
of tribal lands. At issue in Johnson was the title to property in the
Northwest Territory, claimed by the plaintiffs by virtue of direct purchase
from the Piankeshaw Indians. The tribe had also ceded that same property
to the federal government, which had subsequently issued a patent to
the defendant. In upholding the defendant's title over that of the plaintiffs,
the Marshall Court drew upon the medieval doctrine of discovery and
articulated two important principles that have remained fundamental
concepts of federal Indian law to this day. 25
First, the Court incorporated the discovery doctrine into domestic law. 26
By virtue of a long-standing agreement among European nations, said
the Court, "discovery gave title to the [European] government by whose
subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, against all other European
governments, which title might be consummated by possession. ' 27 Chief
Justice Marshall gave his imprimatur to this discovery doctrine, even
though he questioned whether the theory might be simply an extravagant
pretension :21
21. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hualpai Indians v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339,
359
(1941) (demonstration that tribe occupied claimed territory exclusively from time immemorial
is
necessary to establish aboriginal possession).
22. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
23. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 9, at 74-78 (describing early acquisition of tribal lands
and
asserting that "[bly the year 1800 the rapid growth of the nation had created a demand for territorial
expansion, which required the extinguishment of native title.").
24. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 591-92.
25. For a modern statement of the principles set forth in Johnson, see Oneida Indian Nation
v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 667-69 (1974).
26. For a philosophical history of the doctrine, see generally Felix S. Cohen, The Spanish Origins
of Indian Rights in the Law of the United States, 31 GEO. L.J. 1 (1942).
27. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 573. The Marshall formulation of the discovery doctrine may not
be
entirely consistent with medieval philosophy. As espoused by prominent medieval thinkers such
as
Francisco de Victoria, the theory provided originally that discovery conveyed title to vacant
property
only. COHEN, supra note 9, at 50-51 (citing NYs, INTRODUCTION TO F. VICTORIA, DE INDIS
ET DE
IVRE BELLI REFLECTIONES (J. Bate trans., Carnegie Institution 1917) (1557)).
28. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 591. In less charitable terms, Robert Williams has described the western
discourse based upon the discovery doctrine as "ultimately genocidal in both its practice
and its
intent." ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT,
THE
DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 326 (1990).
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Did these adventurers, by sailing along the coast, and occasionally
landing on it, acquire for the several governments to whom they
belonged, or by whom they were commissioned, a rightful property
or rightful dominion
in the soil, from the Atlantic to the Pacific;
29
over the numerous people who occupied it?
In overcoming his own doubts, Justice Marshall relied upon30 established
custom to support the acquisition of territory by discovery. As a consequence of this exclusive right of the discovering sovereign to extinguish
native title, any conveyance by the tribes to individuals or to states
3
without federal approval was void. Second, the Court derived the principle that Indian title was less than full fee simple ownership, an interest
described as a "right of occupancy" subject to the "ultimate dominion"
3 2
of the federal government.
Justice Marshall's discourse, although eloquent and politically expedient,
33
sanctioned the conquest of Indian lands. The view that a tribe's right
to its homeland constituted less than full fee simple title was rooted in
a Eurocentric view of the inferiority of the Indian people, the idea that
"the character and religion of [the Indians] afforded an apology for
considering them as a people over whom the superior genius of Europe
34
might claim an ascendancy."1 The comments of one of Marshall's colleagues, Justice Story, demonstrate the racist underpinnings of the discovery doctrine: "As infidels, heathens, and savages, [the Indian natives]
were not allowed to possess the prerogatives belonging to absolute, sovereign, and independent nations. The territory over which they wandered,
and which they used for their temporary and fugitive purposes, was, in
respect to Christians, deemed as if it were inhabited only by brute
animals. "3 5
At the same time, however, Johnson and the cases that follow it
challenged the nation to adopt an idealistic vision of Indian tribes as

29. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 543 (1832).
30. Justice Marshall wrote,
However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of an inhabited
country into conquest may appear; if the principle has been asserted in the first
instance, and afterwards sustained; if a country has been acquired and held under
it; if the property of the great mass of the community originates in it, it becomes
the law of the land, and cannot be questioned.
Johnson, 21 U.S. at 591.
31. Id. at 574 ("[Tribal] power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they
pleased, was denied by the original fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to
those who made it.").
32. Id. The tribes' interest in their native lands is generally called "aboriginal Indian title,"
"original Indian title," or "Indian title." See Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272,
279 (1955) (holding that tribe's aboriginal entitlement to occupancy was not a property right, but
a usufructuary privilege terminable at congress' discretion); Cohen, Original Indian Title, supra note
2, at 28.
33. For a discussion of the compromise nature of Johnson in light of a developing power struggle
between the Supreme Court and the Jackson administration, see Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee
Cases: A Study in Law, Politics and Morality, 21 STAN. L. REV. 500 (1969).
34. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 572-73.
§ 152, at 106
35. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
(5th ed. 1891).
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semi-autonomous governments subject to federal, but not state, control. 36
Although adoption of that 'vision may have been but a small victory for
the Indian people, it has led to the practice of acquiring Indian lands
through purchase rather than conquest.37 Through almost four hundred
treaties, the United States has purchased over two million square miles
of land from Indian tribes at an estimated cost of at least eight hundred
million dollars.38 In exchange for this cession of territory, treaties reserve
smaller tracts of property for exclusive tribal occupancy.3 9 In 1871, Congress ended the practice of treaty-making with Indian tribes. 40 Thereafter,
compacts between Indian people and the federal government took the
form of agreements, executive orders, and statutes- "treaty substitutes"
subject to the same special interpretative rules applied to treaties . 4 After
aboriginal title has been recognized by treaty or other agreement, Indian
property rights may not be extinguished without compensation. 42 Although
tribes may have been formidable negotiating partners for some early
treaties, in subsequent agreements the parties' bargaining positions were
vastly unequal and overreaching was common. 4 3 In part to ameliorate
the harshness of treaty negotiation, the Supreme Court has developed a

number of doctrines for the implementation of treaties in a manner
favorable to the tribes. 44
B.

The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
Justice Marshall's decision in Johnson v. M'Intosh-while clearly paving
the way for American expansionism under the rule of law-was not
without a certain amount of moral anguish and a disclaimer of judicial
authority to re-direct the course of the nation. 45 Just twenty years later,
36. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17-18 (1831) (describing Indian tribes
as "domestic dependent nations"); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (discussing
the inherent sovereignty of the Cherokee Nation).
37. See Johnson, 21 U.S. at 545. See WILKINSON, supra note 20, at 5 ("for all of its many
flaws, the policy of the United States toward its native people is one of the most progressive of
any nation."). A leading critic of federal Indian policy grudgingly accedes to that view. WLIAMS,
supra note 28, at 326. After references to the United States' "racist discourse of conquest that at
its core regards tribal peoples as normatively deficient and culturally, politically, and morally
inferior[,]" Professor Williams concedes that the United States' treatment of its native peoples is
one of the most liberal and progressive among Western Nations. Id.
38. See Cohen, Original Indian Title, supra note 2, at 34; WILKINSON, supra note 20, at 8
(approximately 389 treaties were negotiated with Indian tribes).
39. These transactions were "not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from
them-a reservation of those not granted." United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
40. Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (1871) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1994)).
41. COHEN, supra note 9, at 48-49.
42. See, e.g., Confederated Bands of Ute Indians v. United States, 330 U.S. 169, 176 (1947).
43. For treaties negotiated prior to 1815, the Indians may have negotiated from a position of
some power because the United States needed the tribes as an ally against Great Britain. Wilkinson
& Volkman, supra note 6, at 607-08. See also United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329
U.S. 40, 48 (1946) (although early treaties were not coerced, sharp dealing was common in later
treaty negotiations).
44. See infra part IV.B.
45. The Court rationalized that "[c]onquest gives a title which the courts of the conqueror
cannot deny, whatever the private and speculative opinions of individuals may be, respecting the
original justice of the claim which has been successfully asserted." Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S.
(8 Wheat.) 543, 588 (1823).
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however, the country was emboldened by a new sense of purpose, relatively
untroubled by moral doubts. As journalist John O'Sullivan wrote in 1845
concerning the nation's westward expansion,
Away, away with all these cobweb tissues of rights of discovery,
exploration, settlement, contiguity, etc..... The American claim is
by the right of our manifest destiny to overspread and to possess the
whole of the continent which Providence has given us for the development of the great experiment of liberty and federative selfgovernment entrusted to us. It is a right such as that of the tree to
the space of air and earth suitable for the full expansion of its
principle and destiny of growth. 46
Prompted by this spirit of "manifest destiny," the United States declared
war against Mexico on May 13, 1846, seeking to acquire the territories47
of Texas.
of California and New Mexico and to settle the boundaries
At the war's conclusion in 1848, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo required
4
Mexico to cede nearly half its territory to its northern neighbor. The
United States thus acquired over 529,000 square miles of land for the
sum of fifteen million dollars. 49 The treaty has been criticized as "one
of the harshest in modern history." 50
The final text of the treaty touches but briefly upon the subject of
Mexican private property rights." Article VIII promises to respect such
rights, even when the landowner is absent:
Mexicans now established in territories previously belonging to Mexico,
and which remain for the future within the limits of the United States
... shall be free to continue where they now reside, or to remove

at any time to the Mexican Republic, retaining the property which
they possess in the said territories, or disposing thereof and removing
the proceeds where they please ....

46. WHITE, supra note 2, at 73.
47. RICHARD GRISWOLD DEL CASTILLO, THE TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO,

A LEGACY 'OF

CONFLICT 16-17 (1990) [hereinafter GRISWOLD]. See generally HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL
SECURITY CONSTITUTION, SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 84 (1990). Professor Koh

describes President Polk's presidency-during which the Mexican War occurred-as "an almost
frantic period of territorial conquest" during which the national territory was increased by nearly
fifty percent. Id.
48. See VICTOR WESTPHALL,

MERCEDES REALES: HISPANIC

LAND GRANTS OF THE UPPER RIO

GRAND REGION 74 (1st ed. 1983). The United States also assumed over $3.2 million in claims against
Mexico. Id. See also Bowden, supra note 3, at 468-70.
49. Id. Subsequently, the Gadsden Treaty clarified boundary issues left unresolved by the Treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and released the United States from the obligation imposed by the Treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo to police the border and prevent Indian raids into Mexico from the United
States. Boundary Treaty, Dec. 30, 1853, U.S.-Mex., 10 Stat. 1031. See GRISWOLD, supra note 47,
at 55-61. Under the Gadsden Treaty, Mexico ceded an additional 29,142,000 acres in exchange for
$10 million. Id.
50. Malcolm Ebright, New Mexican Land Grants: The Legal Background, in LAND, WATER AND
CULTURE, supra note 18, at 28 (quoting Luis G. ZORRILLA, 1 HISTORIA DR LAS RELACIONES ENTRE
MIXICO Y Los ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMERICA 218 (1965)) (treaty was imposed on Mexico, not fairly
negotiated). See also GRISWOLD, supra note 47, at 15 (quoting HUBERT HOWE BANCROFT, HISTORY

1824-1861 (1885)) (stating that the peace secured by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
"was nothing better than barefaced robbery").
51. For a discussion of proposed article X, see infra note 204 and accompanying text.

OF MEXICO,
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In the said territories, property of every kind, now belonging to
Mexicans not established there, shall be inviolably respected. The
present owners, the heirs of these, and all Mexicans who may hereafter
acquire said property by contract, shall enjoy with respect to it,
guaranties equally ample as if the same belonged to citizens of the
United States. 2
In addition, Article IX of the treaty guaranteed that Mexicans present
in the territory would be "maintained and protected in the free enjoyment
of their liberty and property" while awaiting American citizenship."
Disagreement over the meaning of those promises has fostered over a
century of litigation and legislation. In large measure, the courts deferred
to the perceived intention of Congress with respect to the implementation
of Article VIII, an intent that received an increasingly strict interpretation
over time.5 4 Congress, for its part, regarded the treaty as not self-executing
and established a number of mechanisms for the confirmation of Mexican
property rights. 5 Under each, the burden of proof was placed upon the
Mexican landowner to demonstrate the legitimacy of his or her claim
under Spanish and Mexican law. 5 6 As a result of these and numerous
other factors, a substantial portion of Mexican land claims were not
recognized by the United States. 7
Article VIII committed the United States to the difficult enterprise of
determining the legality of title to millions of acres, claimed under
hundreds of land grants made by the Spanish and Mexican governments
over a span of some 150 years. 8 It is one thing to promise to respect
those property rights; it is quite another to determine, acre-by-acre, the
precise dimension's of that promise. As Justice Brewer noted in frustration:
Few cases presented to this court are more perplexing than those
involving Mexican grants. The changes in the governing power as well
as in the form of government were so frequent, there is so much
indefiniteness and lack of precision in the language of the statutes
and ordinances, and the modes of procedure were in so many respects
essentially different from those to which we are accustomed, that it
is often quite difficult to determine whether an alleged grant was
made by officers who, at the time, were authorized to act for the

52. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, supra note 7, at art. VIII (emphasis added).
53. Id. For the citizenship options conferred by the treaty, see infra notes 103-106
and accompanying text.
54. See infra part IW.A.
55. See infra part IV.A.
56. See infra part IW.A.
57. See infra part IV.A.
58. The first recorded Spanish land grants in New Mexico date from 1693. See generally
Westphall,
supra note 48, at 17. One author has calculated that were 303 Spanish and Mexican
land grants
in the southwestern United States, involving a territory of over 35 million acres.
Bowden, supra
note 3, at 472.
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government, and was consummated according to the forms of procedure then recognized as essential.5 9
The problem of distinguishing private Mexican property rights from the
new addition to the United States public domain was exacerbated by the
two nations' widely-divergent perceptions of property rights. In the conquered territory, titles were derived from land grants issued by the Mexican
government and by Spain, its predecessor. 60 Those grants-made to both
individuals and to groups of settlers-were designed to reward military
service and to encourage the settlement of new territories, securing them61
against Indian invasion and the colonization efforts of other nations.
Through the implementation of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the
United States' conception of individual, freely-alienable property rights
was imposed upon a land-dependent culture in which common land
62
ownership was vitally important to community's continued survival.
The United States' westward expansion, then, affected the property of
both Native American tribes and Hispanic communities. Despite that
basic similarity, the courts have adopted a noticeably different legal
approach toward the two groups. The next section will explore the
fundamental point of divergence: the assumption of a federal trust duty
toward the Indian tribes.
III.

A UNIQUE OBLIGATION TOWARD INDIAN TRIBES:
THE FEDERAL TRUST DUTY

The expansionist efforts of the nineteenth century resulted in the presence of several conquered peoples within the United States. The Indian
tribes-unlike any other ethnic group within the nation-had no possibility
of retreat to an external "homeland" as their land base in the United
States was reduced. The United States recognized tribal sovereignty to
a limited extent 63 and acknowledged a duty to protect the "domestic
dependent nations" within its borders. 64 The Mexican people, in contrast,
retained a sovereign homeland despite the fact that the northern half of
their nation had been severed from the rest of the country. As a result,
the Hispanic communities remaining within the United States' new borders
had neither sovereign nor protected status under their new government.

59. Ely's Administrator v. United States, 171 U.S. 220, 223 (1898).
60. Spain claimed what is now the southwestern United States until 1821, when Mexico gained
its independence. WHITE, supra note 2, at 3-4, 37-39.
61. LAND, WATER AND CULTURE, supra note 18, at 3.
62. Id. at 8-10. See also G. Emlen Hall, Land Litigation and the Idea of New Mexico Progress,
in SPANISH AND MEXICAN LAND GRANTS AND THE LAW 48 (Malcolm Ebright ed., 1989) (discussing
the "fundamentally different conceptions of real property" held by Anglos and Hispanos).
63. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) ("The sovereignty that the Indian
tribes retain is of a unique and limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of Congress and
is subject to complete defeasance.").
64. This duty arose, in part, from "the tribes' limited inherent sovereignty and their corresponding
dependency on the United States for protection." CONFERENCE OF WESTERN ATTORNEYS GENERAL,
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK 4 (1993) [hereinafter DESKBOOK].
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A.

The Status of Indian Tribes as Wards of the Nation
In theory, Indian treaty rights merit special federal protection, expressed
in terms of the United States' "trust duty" toward its Indian "wards": 6
In carrying out its treaty obligations with the Indian tribes the Government is something more than a mere contracting party. Under a
humane and self-imposed policy which has found expression in many
acts of Congress and numerous decisions of this Court, it has charged
itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust.
Its conduct, as disclosed in the acts of those who represent it in
dealings with the Indians, should therefore be judged by the most
exacting fiduciary standards.6

In practice, the trust duty has been a double-edged sword. As explained
in this section, although it has spawned numerous doctrines favorable
to Indian tribes, the trust theory is also a doctrine rooted in prejudice
that has been used to justify the sweeping exercise of federal authority
over tribal affairs.
The origin of the federal trust duty has been traced generally to the
opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.67 In
Cherokee Nation, the Cherokees sought an injunction to restrain the
State of Georgia from enforcing its laws within Cherokee territory. 68 The
Court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the lawsuit because the Cherokee
Nation was not a "foreign state" within the meaning of Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution. 69 Rather, asserted Justice Marshall, Indian
tribes might better be described as "domestic dependent nations" occupying a territory conquered by the United States.70 Justice Marshall
emphasized that the association between the federal government and Indian
tribes is sui generis, a relation that "resembles that of a ward to his
guardian' '7 and one that is marked by several "peculiar and cardinal
distinctions. ' 72 The tribes were described as conquered states within the
boundaries of the United States. 73 Despite that fact, said Marshall, the
Indian nations owe an allegiance to the United States and look to it for
74
protection.

65. See generally Wilkinson & Volkman, Indian Treaty Abrogation, supra note 6, at 620-23.
66. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942). Historical evidence suggests
that a similar guardianship was probably extended over the Indians by the governments of Spain
and Mexico. See United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 442 (1926).
67. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). Marshall's statements in Cherokee Nation "implied that [federal
power over tribes] ... should be limited by a correlative duty akin to the fiduciary duty that a
guardian owes a ward." Collins, supra note 2, at 259.
68. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 1.
69. Id. at 15-17. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over, inter alia, "controversies
... between a State, . . . and foreign States .
U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
70. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 16.
71. Id. at 17.
72. Id. at 16.
73. Id. at 17 ("They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of their will,
which must take effect in point of possession when their right of possession ceases.").
74. Id. at 17 ("They look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its
power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the President as their great father.").
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The trust status has been both a blessing and a detriment to Native
Americans. 75 It has served as the conceptual basis for doctrines such as
the canons of construction, under which Indian treaties are to be construed
"in the sense in which the Indians understood them, and 'in a spirit
which generously recognizes the full obligation of this nation to protect
the interest of a dependent people.' ' 76 It has protected Indian lands from
loss due to the overreaching of the states and of non-Indian individuals7
by forbidding the conveyance of Indian lands without federal approval.
Moreover, dependent status has been the basis for tribal exemption from
the payment of certain state and federal property and income taxes. 71 In
addition, the federal government must provide a measure of protection
to Indian property. 9 Finally, where the federal government has breached
its trust duty to the tribes, monetary damages and injunctive or declaratory
relief are available.8 0
The price for such protection has been dear. The tribes' dependent
status is frequently premised upon a negative and degrading stereotype
of Native Americans. In 1877, for example, the Supreme Court justified
the federal trust obligation by its perception that "the United States
would be governed by such considerations of justice as would control a
Christian people in their treatment of an ignorant and dependent race."',

75. See generally Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for
a Decolonized FederalIndian Law, 46 ARK. L. REV. 77, 129-34 (1993) (advocating the establishment
of a "decolonized" Federal Indian law that retains those elements of the trusteeship justifying
federal protection and redress for past harms, and that jettisons those aspects of the doctrine that
justify the exercise of plenary federal authority over Indian tribes).
76. Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 432 (1943). See infra part IV.B.2.
77. The Supreme Court has recognized that "[blecause of the local ill feeling, the people of
the States where [Indian tribes] are found are often their deadliest enemies." United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886). See infra part VII.B (discussing the nonintercourse statutes).
78. See generally Collins, supra note 2, § 57.11(b)(l), at 298. Exemption from taxation is also
based upon the tribes' inherent sovereign status as political bodies pre-dating the existence of the
United States. Id.
79. See, e.g., Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 364 F.2d 320, 322-23 (Ct. Cl. 1966)
(under the facts of the case, the Department of the Interior was obligated to safeguard tribal
property, with federal conduct judged under "the most exacting fiduciary standards").
80. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 226 (1983) (affirming the award of
monetary damages where the federal government failed to adequately manage and protect tribal
forest resources); United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, Ill (1935). See generally DAVID
H. GETCHES, CHARLES F. WILKINSON, & ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 311-18 (1993); Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims in the Courts of the Conqueror,
41 AM. U. L. REV. 753 (1992); H.D. ROSENTHAL, THEIR DAY IN COURT: A HISTORY OF THE INDIAN
CLAIMS COMMISSION (1990); IRREDEEMABLE AMERICA, THE INDIANS' ESTATE AND LAND CLAIMS (Imre
Sutton ed., 1985); WILCOMBE E. WASHBURN, RED MAN'S LAND, WHITE MAN'S LAW: A STUDY OF
THE PAST AND PRESENT STATUS OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN 99-109 (1971).

Before 1946, the passage of a special congressional act was necessary to waive the federal
government's sovereign immunity and to provide jurisdiction for Indian claims against the federal
government. GETCHES, WILKINSON, & WILLIAMS, supra, at 311. With the passage of the Indian
Claims Commission Act of 1946 (ICCA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 70-70v, specific legislative enactments were
no longer necessary. Id. The ICCA offered only financial compensation, and not the return of
tribal lands. ROSENTHAL, supra, at xi-xii. But see LINDA S. PARKER, NATIVE AMERICAN ESTATE,
THE STRUGGLE OVER INDIAN AND HAWAIIAN LANDS 138-67 (1989) (describing tribes' limited success
in rebuilding their land base through legislation, executive order, and judicial action).
81. Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 525 (1877). See also United States v. Payne, 264 U.S.
446, 448 (1924) (describing tribe as "unlettered"); Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1,
28 (1886) (describing tribe as inferior).
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Furthermore, by the late nineteenth century the idea of a federal obligation
to protect Indian tribes had evolved into a plenary federal authority quite
intrusive into the realm of Indian affairs. The Court made that subtle
transition from protection to power, explaining that "[firom [the tribes']
very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing
of the federal government with them, and the treaties in which it has
been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the
power. ' '82 That plenary authority has been relied upon to justify the
violation of treaties or other agreements with the Indian tribes, with the
Court presuming that Congress' actions have been consistent with perfect
"good faith" toward the tribes.83 Finally, citizenship was not extended
generally to the Indian people until 1924,4 a delay partially attributable
to the perception that Indians were weak and incapable of shouldering
the responsibilities of citizenship."5 The trust duty has not been applied
consistently to all Native Americans. In those territories previously governed by Mexico and Spain, for example, the courts have been unwilling,
at times, to rigorously safeguard tribal rights. 86
B.

The Uncertain Status of the Pueblo Indians
Despite the articulation of a legal framework for the special protection
of Native Americans, it was not clear to what extent that protection
applied to Indians in the territory acquired from Mexico. The case of
the Pueblo Indians illustrates the fickle nature of a legal system premised
upon racial stereotypes and the high psychological toll exacted for legal
protection. In New Mexico, a portion of the territory ceded to the United
87
States by Mexico had been occupied for centuries by Pueblo settlements.
The Pueblos: were sedentary communities, with established governments,
irrigation systems, and patterns of community life,88 but exhibited also
certain characteristics typical of Indians. As a result, the Court had great
difficulty in determining whether or not the Pueblos were "Indians." If
they were, then the federal trust duty would apply and any occupation
of Pueblo lands without federal approval would be invalid.8 9 Conversely,
if the Pueblos were not Indians, then they had the same rights as any
other landowner to sell their property, including a vulnerability to the
sharp-dealing of others.

82. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886). See also infra part IV.B.1.
83. See, e.g., Shoshone v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 497 (1935).
84. Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1987)). See
generally COHEN, supra note 9, at 142-43 (describing history of Indian citizenship).
85. The grant of citizenship to Indians was facilitated by decisions such as United States v.
Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 598 (1916) (holding that wardship and citizenship were not mutually exclusive
conditions).
86. See infra parts III.B (concerning Pueblo Indians) and IV.A.2.c (concerning land claims in
California).
87. See COHEN, supra note 9, at 93.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614 (1876). See also supra part III.A (discussing
the federal trust duty).
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In 1869, the New Mexico territorial court determined that the Pueblo
communities were not entitled to protection under statutes applicable to
Indians. 90 That holding was premised upon the court's perception that
the Pueblos did not fit its negative image of Indian people and its
consequent refusal to assent to "the transfer of eight thousand of the
most honest, industrious, and law-abiding citizens of New Mexico to the
."9 The Pueblos'
*.".
provisions of a code of laws made for savages .
Court in United
Supreme
by
the
status as non-Indians was confirmed
92
of that
"inhabitants
of
those
decisions,
States v. Joseph. As a result
themwho
advised
territory [New Mexico]-and members of the bar
unrestricted
same
had
the
generally believed that the Pueblo Indians
power to dispose of their lands as non-Indians whose title had originated
in Spanish grants." 93
After New Mexico became a state in 1912, the Supreme Court changed
course, holding in United States v. SandovaP4 that Congress had authority
to prohibit the introduction of intoxicating liquors into Pueblo lands
under its constitutional power to regulate commerce with the Indian
tribes. In so doing, the Court implied that the Pueblos were indeed
Indians subject to the federal guardianship. Again, the decision was
rooted in racism:
The people of the pueblos, although sedentary rather than nomadic
in their inclinations, and disposed to peace and industry, are nevertheless Indians in race, customs, and domestic government. Always
living in separate and isolated communities, adhering to primitive
modes of life, largely influenced by superstition and fetichism, and
chiefly governed according to the crude customs inherited from their
they are essentially a simple, uninformed, and inferior
ancestors,
95
people.

The Sandoval decision cast doubt upon numerous non-Indian land rights
Hispanic comwithin the exterior boundaries of the Pueblos, including
96
munities that had been established for generations.
The Court's indecision spanned nearly half a century, leaving uncertain
the status of both Pueblo and Hispanic settlements. 97 As stated by one

90. United States v. Lucero, 1 N.M. 422, 440 (1869). See also United States v. Mares, 88 P.
1128 (N.M. 1907).
91. Lucero, 1 N.M. at 438.
92. 94 U.S. 614, 617 (1876). Joseph held that the Pueblos were not an "Indian tribe" entitled
to protection under the Nonintercourse Act (discussed in infra part VII.B). Id. at 617.
93. Mountain States Tele. & Tele. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 240 (1985).
94. 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
95. Id. at 39. The issue of whether the Pueblos were Indians within the meaning of the
Nonintercourse Act was not confronted squarely until 1926. See United States v. Candelaria, 271
U.S. 432, 441-42 (1926) (holding that Pueblos are Indians for purposes of the Nonintercourse Act).
96. See Mountain States, 472 U.S. at 243. In reliance on the Joseph decision, "3,000 nonIndians had acquired putative ownership of parcels of real estate located inside the boundaries of
the Pueblo land grants." Id. See generally G. Emlen Hall, The Pueblo Grant Labyrinth, in LAND,
WATER,

AND

CULTURE,

supra note 18, at 69, 98 (describing Hispanic settlements within Pueblo

territory dating back to 1693).
97. Under the Spanish and Mexican governments, too, the status of Pueblo lands was ambiguous.
See LAND, WATER AND CULTURE, supra note 18, at 69-71.
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commentator, that ambiguity "has left New Mexico's two oldest, poorest,
and most vulnerable populations-Pueblo Indians and Hispanos-pitted
afgainst one another in a never-ending battle for the extraordinarily pinched
natural resources of what one Spanish priest correctly called 'this miserable
kingdom.' ' 98 Finally, through the Pueblo Lands Act of 1924, 99 Congress
enacted a political compromise designed to provide a final resolution of
the status of Pueblo lands. The Act provided, inter alia, for the establishment of a Pueblo Lands Board to resolve conflicting claims to Pueblo
lands and for the award of compensation for the extinguishment of any
Pueblo land rights.0° Although the Act established prospectively that
Pueblo lands could not be acquired without federal approval, it also
recognized non-Indian title gained previously through adverse possession
by occupation initiated prior to certain specified dates.' 0' Thus, the Pueblo
Indians gained belated and imperfect protection of their lands, but only
after enduring the degradation of a stereotypical definition of "Indian."' 01 2
C.

The Status of Former Mexican Citizens in the Conquered
Territory
Under article VIII of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Mexicans in
the ceded territory had the option of retaining their Mexican citizenship
or of becoming citizens of the United States. 0 3 Those who followed the
latter course of action, probably a majority of the territory's occupants,'0 4
found themselves in a particularly vulnerable situation. Because they were
no longer citizens of Mexico, that government owed them no duty of
protection. At the same time, the federal government of the United States
extended no special guardianship to help its new citizens adjust to life
under an unfamiliar political regime.'0 5 While they were awaiting American
citizenship, former Mexican citizens' rights and property were insecure
and subject to discriminatory attack. During the California gold rush of
the mid-nineteenth century, for example, the fear that "foreigners"many of whom were native to California-would monopolize gold profits
prompted violence, harassment, and vigilantism against those of Mexican

98. Id. at 71. Hall describes the harsh, arid land of New Mexico as "resource-poor, sceneryrich." Id. at 69.
99. Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 331, 43 Stat. 636.
100. Id. §§ 2, 6, 43 Stat. at 637.
101. Id. §§ 4, 17, 43 Stat. at 641-642.
102. Through the mechanism established by the Pueblo Lands Act, about 80% of non-Indian
claims within the Pueblos, involving some 50,000 acres, were approved. LAND, WATER, AND CULTURE
supra note 18, at 120-21.
103. Act of Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922, 929. Mexicans who remained in the ceded territory without
declaring within one year their intention to remain Mexican citizens were presumed to have elected
to become citizens of the United States. Id.
104. See GRISWOLD, supra note 47, at 63-66.
105. Although litigants have argued that the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo created a federal trust
duty akin to the guardianship extended over Native American tribes, at least one lower court has
rejected that argument. See, e.g., Havasupai Tribe v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 1471, 1488 (D.
Ariz. 1990) (treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo creates no specific fiduciary duty owed by the federal
government).
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descent.' °0 Unlike the case with Indian lands where the Indian Claims
1 the United States
Commission was created to remedy treaty violations, 07
has never established an Hispanic Claims Commission to allow former
Mexican citizens and their descendants to seek compensation for the
wrongful taking of Hispanic property. 10 8 At the same time, it is unlikely
that even meritorious claims could prevail under existing federal legislation
due to strict statutes of limitation. In Alliance of Descendants of Texas
Land Grants v. United States,10 9 for example, the court acknowledged
that the descendants of land grant owners may well have possessed
actionable claims against the United States for the taking of approximately
twelve million acres of land in southern Texas." I0 Nevertheless, those
claims were barred by the six year statute of limitations applicable to
the Court of Federal Claims."'
In sum, although both the Indian and Mexican people were conquered
by the United States, only the former received special legal protection
from their new government or compensation for the wrongful taking of
property. In part, perhaps this disparate treatment was a political response
to the dual status of the Hispanics as both conquistadors and a conquered
people. As one historian has explained, "beginning the story of Occupied
America . . . in 1848, with the [Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo] fudged
a vital fact: the Hispanic presence in the Southwest was itself a product
of conquest, just as much as the American presence was. The Pueblo
Indians found themselves living in Occupied America long before the
Hispanics did."" l1 2 This equitable context against which Hispanic and
Indian property rights are asserted is relevant insofar as it influences the

106. GRISWOLD, supra note 47, at 67-69. The Mexican government did intercede on behalf of its
former citizens, but its efforts were generally unsuccessful. Id. One historian notes the irony of the
prejudice against Mexicans within the United States: "It is surely one of the greater paradoxes of
our time that a large group of these people [Mexicans and Mexican-Americans], so intimately tied
to the history of North America, should be known to us under the label 'aliens."' LIMERICK, supra
note 17, at 254-58. Professor Limerick asks provocatively, "Is today's Mexican immigrant an
illegitimate intruder into territory that was for two and a half centuries a part of Mexico, before
conquest made it American?" Id.
107. See supra note 80.
108. Although the claims of the heirs and descendants of the original land grantees were the
subject of diplomatic negotiations between Mexico and the United States, no compensation has ever
been paid. See Treaty on General Claims, Sept. 8, 1923, U.S.-Mex., 43 Stat. 1730 (creating the
General Claims Commission); Treaty on Final Settlement of Certain Claims, Nov. 19, 1941, U.S.Mex., 56 Stat. 1347 (Mexico assumes obligation to pay its former citizens for lands wrongfully
taken by the United States in exchange for a similar commitment by the United States); Alliance
of Descendants of Texas Land Grants v. United States, 27 Cl. Ct. 837, 839-41 (1993) (asserting
that the General Claims Commission resolved no claims under the 1923 treaty and that Mexico
never completely honored its financial commitments under the 1941 treaty); Asociacion de Reclamantes
v. United Mexican States, 561 F. Supp. 1190, 1192-94 (D. D.C. 1983) (same).
Several commentators have advocated the establishment of an Hispanic land claims commission.
See, e.g., WESTPHALL, supra note 48, at 273; Donald C. Cutter, The Legacy of the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo, 53 N.M. HIST. REV. 305, 314 (1978).
109. 27 Cl. Ct. 837 (1993).
110. Id. at 839.
111. Id. at 841.
112. LIMERICK, supra note 17, at 255.
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national political will and lobbying forces in support of the protection
of conquered peoples within the United States." 3
IV.

THE DIMINISHMENT OF TREATY PROMISES BY
SUBSEQUENT FEDERAL LEGISLATION
Despite the timeless rhetoric invoked by many treaties, the promises
they contain are often ephemeral. ' 4 Frequently, Congress has minimized
or superseded treaty pledges by later-enacted statutes. The courts have
supported this practice under several legal theories, recognizing generally
the equality of treaty and federal statute and favoring the later in time
in cases of conflict." 5 Although the underlying international obligation
remains intact and redressable through diplomatic channels, such treaties
would no longer create duties under domestic law enforceable in the
6

courts of the nation."1

The equality of treaty and statute in domestic law has devalued the
property rights protections contained in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
and in Indian treaties. In the former case, the property provisions are
not regarded as "self-executing," and therefore do not take effect until
Congress has passed implementing legislation."' With respect to Indian
treaties, property guarantees have been "abrogated" frequently by sub8
sequent inconsistent legislation."

A.

Federal Legislation and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo guaranteed that private property
rights would be "inviolably respected" and that the inhabitants of the
conquered territory would be "maintained and protected in the free

enjoyment of their liberty and property .

. . .

19 The Supreme Court

expressed its confidence that the United States would live up to those
solemn promises:
[The United States] have desired to act as a great nation, not seeking,
in extending their authority over the ceded country, to enforce forfeitures, but to afford protection and security to all just rights which
could have been claimed from the government they superseded.' 20

113. See, e.g., LAND, WATER AND CULTURE, supra note 20, at 313, 345 (discussing the history
of land and water rights in northern New Mexico and concluding that "[i]t
is therefore no mere
coincidence that while an Anglo lobby stepped forth to advocate the Indian land cause [in Taos],
none did so for the Hispano").
114. See, e.g, Treaty with the Cherokees, May 6, 1828, Preamble, 7 Stat. 311 (establishing a
"permanent home" for the Cherokee Nation and guaranteeing that it will remain
theirs "forever").

115. See Louis

HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION

156-57, 163-64 (1972) [hereinafter

Professor Henkin argues that such equality was not inevitable and cannot be
supported on the basis of Article VI of the Constitution. Id.
116. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115 cmt. b
FOREIGN AFFAIRS].

(1986).
117. See infra part IV.A.
118. See infra part IV.B.
119. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, supra note 7, at arts. VIII, IX.
120. United States v. Auguisola, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 352, 358-59 (1863) (affirming confirmation
of Mexican land grant in California).
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Despite such generous pronouncements, many property rights arising under

Spanish and Mexican land grants were not recognized by the United
States. In California, approximately twenty-seven percent of land grant
claims were rejected; in the territory of New Mexico, some seventy-six
"
percent of such claims were rejected. 12'
These land loss statistics can be attributed, in significant part, to the
fact that the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was not regarded as self-

executing.

22

As a result, Mexican property rights were not ratified by

the treaty itself but had to await congressional action for their confirmation. Thus, the implementing legislation and not the treaty became
' 2a
That legislation, in turn, required
effectively the "law of the land.'
Mexican landowners to assume the burden of proving the validity of
their titles and to negotiate a maze of legal requirements implemented
24
by a system and in a language that were foreign to them. Even confirmed
were subsequently lost due to the enormous costs
land grants, moreover,
25
1
of litigation.
As this section will discuss, courts virtually ignored the language of
the treaty in their adjudication of Hispanic land claims. Instead, judicial
interpretation focused almost exclusively upon the treaty's implementing
legislation-statutes that received an increasingly strict interpretation over
time. 26 The tone of morality and judicial activism relatively common in
early Indian treaty cases 27 was gradually replaced by an amoral pragmatism and by consistent deference to the perceived intent of Congress.
1. The Theory of Self-Executing Treaties
Although the United States Constitution provides that treaties are "the
supreme law of the land," a like status has been assigned to federal
statutes. 21 In an effort to establish a hierarchy among the various types
of federal law, the Supreme Court has created the doctrine of the self-

121. Bowden, supra note 3, at 472, 497.
122. Land claims were also lost due to fraud, ambiguous boundary descriptions, and size limitations
imposed by the laws of Spain and Mexico. See generally LAND, WATER, AND CULTURE, supra note
18, at 30-31; Victor Westphall, Fraud and Implications of Fraud in the Land Grants of New Mexico,
49 N.M. HIST. REV. 189, 214 (1974) (arguing that exaggerated land grant claims involved greed
rather than fraud, and concluding that "the greater crime was the apathy of Congress in allowing
grants to remain for so long in an unsettled condition"); Clark Knowlton, Causes of Land Loss
Among the Spanish Americans of Northern New Mexico, I ROCKY MTN. Soc. Sci. J. 201 (Apr.
1964).
123. See HENKN, supra note 115, at 157.
124. See, e.g., Whitney v. United States, 167 U.S. 529, 547 (1897) (claimants must prove validity
of alleged grant by a fair preponderance of the evidence).
125. GRISWOLD, supra note 47, at 73-74, (citing Teschemacher v. Thompson, 18 Cal. 11 (1861)
(asserting that land owners in California had been forced to dispose of their property at half its
value to pay legal expenses)); Bowden, supra note 3, at 509-10 (describing plight of the descendants
of land grantees, in which the cost of perfecting the title to their lands would in many cases exceed
its fair market value).
126. See infra parts IV.A.2 and IV.A.3.
127. See infra part IV.B.
128. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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executing treaty. The principle was first enunciated in 1829 by Chief
Justice Marshall in Foster v. Neilson. 29 Under that doctrine and contrary
to the practice of other western nations, the United States recognizes
that treaties can be effective and binding upon domestic courts without
legislative implementation. 310
In Foster, plaintiffs claimed land in West Florida (now Louisiana)
under a grant from the King of Spain made prior to the transfer of
that territory to the United States.' The 1819 Treaty of Cession warranted
that all Spanish land grants made prior to a specified date "shall be
ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession of the lands, to the
same extent that the same grants would be valid if the territories had
remained under the dominion of his catholic majesty."'1 2 That provision,
said the Court in denying plaintiffs' right to the property, was merely
a promise of future action by the legislature, and not a present rule for
the Court.'
Despite its determination that the treaty in issue was not
effective without subsequent legislation, however, the Court recognized
the theoretical possibility under United States law of a self-executing
treaty:
A treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations, not a legislative
act. It does not generally effect, of itself, the object to be accomplished,
especially so far as its operation is infra-territorial; but is carried into
execution by the sovereign power of the respective parties to the
instrument.
In the United States a different principle is established. Our Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently,
to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the
legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any
legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import a
contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a particular
act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract before it can
become a rule for the Court.' 34
Four years later, in United States v. Percheman,135 Justice Marshall
changed his position and held that the 1819 treaty with Spain was in
fact self-executing. That reversal was based upon new evidence demonstrating that the Spanish version of the treaty should have been translated

129. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
130. MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 73 (1988) (stating that the
concept of the self-executing treaty is a significant contribution made by the United States to
international law); HENKIN, supra note 115, at 156 n.94 (discussing the role of treaties in western
parliamentary systems); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ Ill reporters' note 5 (1986) (few states other than the United States recognize a distinction between
self- and non-self-executing treaties).
131. Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 310.
132. Id. (emphasis added).
133. Id. at 314-15.
134. Id.
135. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
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36
as land grants "shall remain ratified," rather than "shall be ratified."'
As Foster and Percheman illustrate, the classification of treaties as
either self-executing or non-self-executing is an inexact science. In the
absence of specific guidance, policy considerations can play an influential
role in a court's determination.1 3 7 In elevating specific legislative procedures
over the general property guarantees of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,
courts were swayed by a desire to separate Hispanic property from the
public domain as quickly as possible in order to facilitate westward
expansion.13 Ironically, then, the theoretical framework of self-executing
treaties emerged first in a Spanish land grant case. The theory was not
applied in that case, however, nor in numerous cases construing Spanish
and Mexican land grants under the subsequent Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo.

Land Claims in California: Distinguishing Perfect from
Imperfect Title
The land claims process in California illustrates clearly the disparity
between generous treaty promises and stinting statutory implementation.
There, the treaty's promise of indefinite protection was reduced by statute
to a period of merely two years. Under the California Land Settlement
Act of 1851,139 "each and every person claiming lands in California by
virtue of any right or title derived from the Spanish or Mexican
government"' 4 was required to submit such claim for adjudication before
a special three-person commission.' 4' That provision was broadly construed, with "each and every person" encompassing Hispanic land grant2.

ees,

42

Indian tribes,

43

and the State of California'" itself. Failure to

present a claim Within two years after the Act's passage would result in
a harsh penalty-the claimed property would be deemed to belong to
45 The accelerated claims adjuthe public domain of the United States.
dication mandated by the Act can be attributed, in part, to the discovery
of gold in California and the resultant pressure by gold prospectors to
open lands to mining exploration.' 46 Out of the 813 claims presented,

136. Id. at 69 (emphasis added).
137. Recognizing this ambiguity, in some cases the Senate has stated specifically its intent as to
whether or not a particular treaty is self-executing. See Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the
United States Senate Concerning "Self-Executing" and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 515, 516-17 (1991).
138. See, e.g., Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U.S. 238 (1889), discussed in infra part IV.A.2.b.
139. Act of March 3, 1851, ch. XL1, 9 Stat. 631.
140. Id. § 8 (emphasis added).
141. Id. § 1.
142. See infra part IV.A.2.b.
143. See infra part IV.A.2.c.
144. See infra part VI.A.
145. Id. at § 13 ("That ... all lands the claims to which shall not have been presented to the
said commissioners within two years after the date of this act, shall be deemed, held, and considered
as part of the public domain of the United States.").
146. Peralta v. United States, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 434, 439 (1865).
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the California commission confirmed title to 604 of them, involving some
147
nine million acres of property.
a. Decisions of the California Supreme Court
The Act's two-year limitation period, requiring the forfeiture of lands
not presented promptly for adjudication, created a potential conflict with
the treaty guarantee of inviolable respect for property rights. The state
supreme court, however, minimized such conflict through a restrictive
interpretation of the Act under which only imperfect titles required
adjudication before the land claims commission. In Minturn v. Brower,148
the California Supreme Court held that a land grant from the Mexican
government-complete and perfect under the terms of Mexican law-was
not subject to forfeiture for failure to present the grant for adjudication
before the land claims commission. In reaching that decision, the court
distinguished between perfect and imperfect land titles. The Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo was. construed as self-executing such that perfect
grants "stood confirmed by the treaty acting at the time of its creation,
eo instanti, directly upon the subject" and need not be presented to the
land claims commission for confirmation. 49 Imperfect or inchoate grants,
in contrast, required confirmation by the new government. 5 0 Although
the United States acquired the Mexican territory "charged with the duty
of carrying out in good faith the obligations of the former Government,"
it could justly "prescribe the proceeding necessary to accomplish the duty
which devolved upon it to invest the grantee with a perfect title."''
Until 1889, the California Supreme Court exempted perfect land grants
from the Act's adjudication requirement.112 Such accommodation of statute and treaty comported with the United States Supreme Court's general
admonition early in that century that "an act of Congress ought never
to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains."' 53 It was also consistent with previous land grant
decisions under earlier treaties in which the United States Supreme Court
stated that under the law of nations, perfect titles were "intrinsically
valid ... and ... they need[ed] no sanction from the legislative or
judicial departments of this country."'' 54
147. GRISWOLD, supra note 47, at 73-74. All decisions of the commission could be
appealed to
federal district court and, thereafter, to the United States Supreme Court. Act of March
3, 1851,
ch. 41, §§ 9-10, 9 Stat. 631, 633. In their determinations, courts were to be guided
by the treaty,
international law, principles of equity, and the laws, usages, and customs of Spain
and Mexico.
Id. at § 11.
148. 24 Cal. 644, 662-63 (1864).
149. Id. at 663, 672.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See Botiller v. Dominguez, 16 P. 241 (1887), rev'd, 130 U.S. 238 (1889).
153. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (interpreting
federal
statute in a manner that avoids conflict with international law principles).
154. United States v. Wiggins, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 334, 350 (1840) (construing 1819 treaty
under
which Spain ceded Florida to the United States). See also United States v. Percheman,
32 U.S. (7
Pet.) 51 (1833) (perfect titles are protected by the law of nations and are not subject to
investigation
and confirmation by United States government); United States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 691
(1832) (same).
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b. Botiller v. Dominguez
The issue decided in Minturn first reached the United States Supreme
Court in the 1889 case of Botiller v. Dominguez.' In Botiller, a Mexican
land grantee brought an action in ejectment to recover possession of the
grant from settlers claiming title under the United States' homestead laws.
The plaintiff's land grant was undisputedly complete and perfect under
the laws of Mexico, but had not been presented to the land claims
56
commission for confirmation. In reversing the decision of the California
Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court held "that no title to
land in California, dependent upon Spanish or Mexican land grants can
the board of
be of any validity" unless presented to and confirmed by
5 7 In so holding,
statute.
by
prescribed
time
the
within
land commissioners
the Court invalidated a perfect title that had been granted by Mexico
twenty years previously.'5 8
Botiller is an important case, documenting the Court's emerging pragmatism and increased willingness to defer to Congress in matters involving
Spanish and Mexican land grants. Half a century earlier, Chief Justice
Marshall had considered a similar statute governing land claims in the
Florida territory acquired from Spain in 1819.119 That legislation, similar
to the Act at issue in Botiller, established a commission for the settlement
of land claims in Florida and provided that all claims not filed with the
6
commissioners within one year were void. ' In dicta, Justice Marshall
to forfeit
stated that "[ilt is impossible to suppose,,that Congress intendedperiod.'
' 6'
a
real titles, not exhibited to their commissioners within so short
He supported that position with a strained interpretation of the statute
such that "[t]he provision, that claims not filed with the commissioners
[within one year] should be void, can mean only that they should be
held so by the commissioners, and not allowed by them. Their power
should not extend to claims filed afterwards.' '162
The Botiller Court, in contrast, clearly believed that Congress intended
to forfeit real titles not presented to the California commission within
two years. 163 Its reasoning was influenced heavily by practical concerns
created by the discovery of gold in California. The resulting "rush of
emigration almost unparalleled in history" created a pressing need to

155. 130 U.S. 238 (1889), rev'g, 16 P. 241 (1887).
156. Botiller, 130 U.S. at 238-39.
157. Id. at 255-56.
158. See id. at 242.
159. See United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89 (1833).
160. Id.at 90.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. The act's legislative hist6ry suggests a contrary intention. The bill's sponsor, Senator William
Gwin, stated that, "If [the legislation] attempted to forfeit the title of any individual who did not
present his claim, . . . it would be unconstitutional-it would be attempting to do that which I
think we have not right to do ... but the bill attempts no such thing." Cong. Globe, 31st Cong.,
2d Sess. 363-64 (1851).
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distinguish private lands from those belonging to the government. 164 The
1851 statute, said the Court, was well tailored to accomplish that purpose
provided that it was applied to all Hispanic land claims-perfect and
inchoate, legal and equitable. 165 An expansive application of the statute,
reasoned the Court, would avoid past difficulties encountered by the
United States under cessions of territory in Florida and Louisiana, where
attempts to distinguish private lands from the public domain "failed for
want of a clear, satisfactory and simple mode of doing it, by bringing
all the parties before a tribunal essentially judicial in its character, whose
decisions should be final without further reference to Congress.' 1 66
In rejecting plaintiff's argument that the California statute was invalid
because it conflicted with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the Court
considered neither the language of the treaty, nor whether a conflict
actually existed, nor possible statutory interpretations that would avoid
such a conflict. Instead, the Court simply read the statute literally and
placed all responsibility for the consequences upon Congress:
[S]o far as the act of Congress is in conflict with the treaty with
Mexico, that is a matter in which the court is bound to follow the
statutory enactments of its own government. If the treaty was violated
by this general statute enacted for the purpose of ascertaining the
validity of claims derived from the Mexican government, it was a
matter of international concern, which the two States must determine
by treaty, or by such other means as enables one State to enforce
upon another the obligations of a treaty. This court, in a class of
cases like the present, has no power to set itself up as the instrumentality for enforcing the provisions of a treaty with a foreign nation
which the government of the United States, as a sovereign power,
chooses to disregard . 67
In retrospect, Botiller marked the decline of judicial activism for the
protection of Spanish and Mexican land grants. 16 1
c. Indian Land Claims in California
The Botiller rationale was applied specifically to Native Americans in
Barker v. Harvey, 69 despite a contrary strain of law supporting a protective
federal guardianship over Indian tribes. In Barker, plaintiffs claiming
land under a confirmed Mexican grant brought a quiet title action against
164. Botiller, 130 U.S. at 244. "It is ...clear that the main purpose of the [California] statute
was to separate and distinguish the lands which the United States owned as property, which could
be sold to others, . . . from those lands which belonged, either equitably or legally, to private
parties under a claim of right derived from the Spanish or Mexican governments." Id. at 249.
165. Id.at 249.
166. Id.at251-52.
167. Id.at 247.

168. See also Florida ex rel. Mitchell v. Furman, 180 U.S. 402 (1901) (holding that a Florida
statute, like that of California, applied to all claims, whether perfect or imperfect); Thompson v.
Los Angeles Farming & Mill Co., 180 U.S. 72 (1901) (California Act was intended to provide
repose to property titles in addition to fulfilling treaty obligations to individuals).
169. 181 U.S. 481 (1900). See supra part III.A for a discussion of the federal guardianship.
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Mission Indians claiming a right of permanent occupancy to the same
lands. 170 The United States Supreme Court affirmed the state court's
confirmation of title in the plaintiffs, finding that plaintiffs' title was
unencumbered by any right of the Indians. The Court's holding was
influenced strongly by the specific factual circumstances of that case,
under which admissible evidence suggested that the Indians had abandoned
171
their occupancy of the claimed territory. In broader language, however,
the Court indicated that the Indian right of occupancy should be considered as a "right or title derived from the .

.

. Mexican government"

even though such right may antedate the establishment of the Mexican
government. 172 Therefore, under the California Act, the Indians' right of
occupancy was deemed abandoned for failure to present it to the land
173
In declining to take special action
claims commission for adjudication.
to protect its Indian wards, the Court described the federal trust duty
as political in nature.

74

Although the Barker decision was the subject of future challenge, it
remained a viable precedent for the invalidation of Indian claims not
presented to the California commission. In United States v. Title Ins. &
Trust Co. ,'17 the Court declined an invitation to overrule Barker because
of the unsettling effect it would have upon property titles in California:
The question whether that decision [Barker] shall be followed here
or overruled admits of but one answer. The decision was given twentythree years ago and affected many tracts of land in California ....
In the meantime there has been a continuous growth and development
in that section, land values have enhanced, and there have been many
transfers. Naturally there has been reliance on the decision ....

It

has become a rule of property,76 and to disturb it now would be fraught
with many injurious results.

That solicitude for the security of land titles apparently did not extend
to Native American property. In a casual aside, the Court remarked,
"[blesides,

. . . the scattered Mission Indians have adjusted their situation

170. Barker, 181 U.S. at 482.
171. Id. at 499.
172. The California land act required that "each and every person claiming lands in California
by virtue of any right or title derived from the Spanish or Mexican government, shall present the
same to the said commissioners" for adjudication." § 8, 9 Stat. at 632 (emphasis added). All such
claims not presented to the commission within two years would be "deemed, held, and considered
as part of the public domain of the United States .... " § 13, 9 Stat. at 633.
173. The Court stated, "[ilf these Indians had any claims founded on the action of the Mexican
government they abandoned them by not presenting them to the commission for consideration
Barker,. 181 U.S. at 491.
....
174. "It is undoubtedly true that ... this court has uniformly construed all legislation in the
light of this recognized obligation. But the obligation is one which rests upon the political department
of the government, and this court has never assumed, in the absence of Congressional action, to
determine what would have been appropriate legislation, or to decide the claims of the Indians as
though such legislation had been had." Id. at 492.
175. 265 U.S. 472 (1924).
176. Id. at 486.
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to it [the United States' denial of their claim to the occupancy and use
of the disputed lands] in several instances.' ' 77
3. Land Claims in the New Mexico Territory
California land decisions established the relative superiority of federal
legislation over the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in the domestic courts
of the nation. The extension of this principle to land claims in New
Mexico-under an even stricter set of statutory directives than those
established for California-served to weaken further the property guarantees contained in the treaty. In particular, New Mexico land decisions
engaged in an increasingly technical interpretation of Mexican law. Under
that view, numerous grants were rejected as incomplete or imperfect17 1
and community land grants were stripped of their common lands. 7 9
In 1854, Congress created the office of the surveyor general to settle
the status of Spanish and Mexican land grants in the Territory of New
Mexico, 1 s0 which included most of the present-day southwest, excluding
California. l8 1 The surveyor general was directed to investigate land claims
and to issue recommendations to Congress whether to confirm or reject
such claims. 8 2 Until Congress took final action, the land remained withheld from sale. 8 3 Unlike California, where the discovery of gold served
as a catalyst for the prompt resolution of land claims, resource-poor
New Mexico was unable to command the full attention of Congress.8 4
The time and finances of the surveyor general, for instance, were vastly
inadequate for this task of determining title to some fifteen million square
miles of territory.8 5 Moreover, congressional action upon the surveyor
general's recommendations was notoriously slow. By 1880, for example,
Congress had resolved only 150 of the one thousand recommendations
made by the surveyor general. 8 6 By 1890, some 116 grants were still

177. Id. See also Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 644 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that the Chumash
Indians had lost their right to California islands for failure to assert claims in the California land
confirmation proceedings).
178. See infra notes 201-207 and accompanying text.
179. See infra part V.B.
180. See Act of July 22, 1854, ch. 103, 10 Stat. 308.
181. New Mexico was the oldest province on the northern border of the Spanish empire in the
Americas. WESTPHALL, supra note 48, at 7. See also D. COLE, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN HISTORY
121 (1968).
182. § 8, 10 Stat. at 309.
183. Id.
184. See WESTPHALL, supra note 48, at 87.
185. See GRISWOLD, supra note 47, at 77; WESTPHALL, supra note 48, at 86 (describing the
"impossible task" of the surveyor general and arguing that Congress was "entirely unreasonable
to expect one man on a part-time basis to cope with the extremely difficult land grant problem in
New Mexico").
186. GRISWOLD, supra note 47, at 78. Congress was reluctant to act due to the complexity of
land grant issues, the large size of many land grants claimed in New Mexico, and a pervasive
feeling that many unsettled land claims were fraudulent. See Michael J. Rock, The Change in
Tenure New Mexico Supreme Court Decisions Have Effected Upon the Common Lands of Community
Land Grants in New Mexico, 13 Soc. Sci. J. 53, 55 (1976).
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pending. 187 As a result of this congressional inattention, many titles
remained uncertain during the 8 thirty-six years that the surveyor general
system remained in existence.
In 1891, Congress established the Court of Private Land Claims to
8I 9 The court was authorized to
resolve the backlog of pending claims.
determine the validity of title and the boundaries of any lands claimed
under a Spanish or Mexican grant in the territories of New Mexico,
Arizona, and Utah and in the states of Nevada, Colorado, and Wyoming.19°
Appeals from the land claims court were to be heard by the United
States Supreme Court. 19' In their decisions, both lower and appellate
courts were to be guided by the treaty, international law, and the laws
and ordinances of Mexico. 92 Unlike the California Act, however, equity
and the usages and customs of the Spanish and Mexican government
were not listed specifically as sources of law, an omission that contributed
to a restrictive interpretation of grants generally and also to the loss of
93
the common lands of community grants. As a result, the court refused
not been
to confirm land grants where the letter of the Mexican law had
94 Simultaneobserved, even if customary practices had been followed.'
ously, the court avoided responsibility for the rejection of numerous land
grants. As the Governor of New Mexico stated in 1903:
[Miany grants, made perhaps a century before the [Court of Private
Land Claims] was established, had existed with titles undisputed by
the people and by the Government under which they were granted,
and in strict equity were justly entitled to be held good, but had to
be rejected by the court, which required proof of strict legal authority
in the granting powers, and a rigid compliance with the law in the
95
form and manner of its execution.

Another dissimilarity between the two acts concerns the treatment of
perfect land claims. The California statute was silent in that regard,
187. Ebright, supra note 50, at 41 (describing the "complete breakdown of the surveyor general
system").
188. WESTPHALL, supra note 48, at 87.
189. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 539, 26 Stat.85 (establishing court of private land claims).
190. §§ 6-7, 26 Stat. at 856-57.
191. § 9, 26 Stat. at 858.
192. § 7, 26 Stat. at 857.
193. Id. See infra part V.B.
194. Earlier land grant decisions had recognized that precise compliance with the law was not
always possible under frontier conditions. See United States v. Sutherland, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 363
(1856) (confirming land grant even though neither boundary nor quantity was defined specifically,
and placing imprecise observance of the law into historical perspective); United States v. Arredondo,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691, 714-15 (1832) (construing 1819 treaty with Spain and presuming congress
intended for courts to consider Mexican custom and usage, equal with written law, in their decisions);
John R. Van Ness, Spanish American vs. Anglo American Land Tenure and the Study of Economic
Change in New Mexico, 13 Soc. Sci. J. 45, 48 (1976):
[T]he exigencies of the harsh frontier environment during the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries and the understandably limited capabilities of the small political
and judicial administration in New Mexico made it impractical, if not impossible,
to abide by the letter of the law.
195. Westphall, supra note 122 (quoting Annual Report of the Governor of New Mexico, Sept.
15, 1903, 58 Cong., 2d. Sess. at 383-84).
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fostering uncertainty and litigation. 196 The 1891 Act-reversing the course
taken by the Supreme Court in Botiller'97-made clear that persons "claiming lands . . . under a title derived from the Spanish or Mexican Gov-

ernment that was complete and perfect at the date when the United States
acquired sovereignty therein, shall have the right (but shall not be bound)
to apply . . . for a confirmation of such title."' 19 Such perfect title,

however, remained vulnerable until judicially confirmed, during which
time the United States could convey the property to another claimant.' 99
In such cases, the first conveyance remained valid and the Hispanic
claimant could petition
for financial compensation for the reasonable
2
value of the lands. 00
Claims "not already complete and perfect"-that is, those land grants
that required additional action by the Spanish or Mexican governments
before good title could be conveyed-were also given strict treatment. 20 1
Although the Act gave the Court of Private Land Claims jurisdiction
over imperfect land grants, all such claims were "deemed

... to be

abandoned and shall be forever barred" unless presented for adjudication
within two years. 20 2 Even timely claims, moreover, were subject to numerous technical objections and to the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the jurisdiction conferred by the Act. Those limitations were
derived from the Act's admonition that:
No claim shall be allowed that shall not appear to be upon a title
lawfully and regularly derived from the Government of Spain or
Mexico, or from any of the States of the Republic of Mexico having
lawful authority to make grants of land, and one that if not then
complete and perfect at the date of the acquisition of the territory
by the United States, the claimant would have had a lawful right to
make perfect had the territory not been acquired by the United States
No ... grant ... to acquire land made upon any condition ...

either antecedent or subsequent, shall be admitted or confirmed unless
it shall appear that every such condition and requirement was performed within the time and in the manner stated in any such ...
grant

....

203

196. See supra part IV.A.2.
197. See supra part IV.A.2.b.
198. § 8, 26 Stat. at 857. See Ainsa v. New Mex. & Ariz. R.R., 175 U.S. 76, 90 (1899) ("A
grant of land in New Mexico, which was complete and perfect before the cession of New Mexico
to the United States, is in the same position as was a like grant in Louisiana or in Florida, and
is not in the position of one under the peculiar acts of Congress in relation to California ....").
199. See infra part VII.A.I.; United States v. Martinez, 184 U.S. 441 (1902) (recognizing validity
of title granted by the United States to third parties before filing of petition for land grant
confirmation).
200. § 14, 26 Stat. at 861.
201. See § 6, 26 Stat. at 856.
202. § 12, 26 Stat. at 859.
203. § 13, cl.1, 8, 26 Stat. at 860.
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That provision effectively vitiated any hope that the new government
would assume responsibility for the perfection of land grants not completed by the former government. In the original text of the treaty, Article
X would have protected explicitly such inchoate titles, providing additional
of
time for their perfection under the new government. As a condition
24
treaty ratification, however, the United States deleted Article X. 0
The legislature, then, gave with one hand and took away with another.
That is, although the 1891 act conferred jurisdiction over inchoate claims,
it was a jurisdiction almost swallowed by restrictions. The Court interpreted that legislative schizophrenia in a manner that made it virtually
impossible for a claimant to obtain confirmation of an incomplete land
grant. For example, the Court routinely disclaimed jurisdiction to confirm
land grants where conditions precedent or subsequent had not been
performed by the time the Mexican territory was ceded to the United
States.25 Similarly, petitions were denied on the basis that the granting
official lacked authority to make valid land grants, even though that
official may have customarily exercised such power. 206 Likewise, land
grants were not confirmed for failure to comply with numerous technicalities found to be part of Spanish and Mexican law during the relevant
time period. 20 7 In many instances, however, the determination of the

204. See GRISWOLD, supra note 47, at 45-49, Appendix 1; Interstate Land Co. v. Maxwell Land
Grant Co., 139 U.S. 569, 588-90 (1891) (construing elimination of article X as express refusal to
recognize imperfect land titles).
205. See United States v. Sandoval, 167 U.S. 278, 294 (1897) (holding that Court of Private
Land Claims lacks jurisdiction to confirm grant of a specific quantity of land within described
outboundaries, where smaller tract had not been specifically located); Ainsa v. United States, 161
U.S. 208, 234 (1896); Interstate Land Co. v. Maxwell Land Co., 139 U.S. 569, 580-82, 587-88
(1891) (instruments of title under which Mexican government "assigned" and "granted" a 60 million
acre tract of land to contractor do not constitute a complete land grant where contractor failed to
satisfy condition requiring the establishment of a colony thereon). Compare United States v. Fremont,
59 U.S. (18 How.) 30, 39 (1856) (in litigation under California Act, Court finds that conditions
subsequent "by the treaty, ceased to have any binding force; and, therefore, they were struck from
the grant as being no necessary part thereof").
206. See United States v. Elder, 177 U.S. 104 (1900) (holding that Mexican prefect and justice
of the peace were not authorized to make land grants, even though those officials apparently.
assumed they had such authority); Hayes v. United States, 170 U.S. 637, 643-48 (1898) (declining
to confirm grant made 70 years previous where the granting authority-the territorial government
of New Mexico-was found to be without authority to make land grants); Crespin v. United States,
168 U.S. 208 (1897) (finding that prefect lacked authority to make land grants, even though similar
grants may have been confirmed by congress or have received the approval of the Mexican authorities).
Cf. United States v. Peralta, 60 U.S. 343 (1856) (under California Act, Court presumes Spanish
official was duly authorized to make land grants); Fremont v. United States, 58 U.S. (17 How.)
541, 561-62 (1854) (under California Act, where official apparently deemed himself authorized to
dispense with the usual conditions for land grants, Court presumes that the power he exercised was
lawful).
207. See Elder, 177 U.S. at 109 (land grant rejected where mere approval by the Mexican territorial
governor of grant petition, coupled with action of the legislative body, was insufficient to establish
validity of title under Mexican law); Bergere v. United States, 168 U.S. 66, 73 (1897) (land grant
rejected as imperfect where petitioner failed to prove that Mexican governor had given final approval
to grant, even though lower official had made report and delivered possession of land 4 years
previous). Cf. United States v. Sutherland, 60 U.S. (I Wall) 363, 365 (1856) (in litigation under
California Act, the Court has no discretion to "defeat just claims . . .by stringent technical rules
of construction"); United States v. Auguisola, 68 U.S. 352, 358 (1863) (under the California Act,
rights of grantees are not dependent upon "the nicest observance of every legal formality").
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substantive content of those laws was based upon a compilation and
translation prepared under the authority of Matthew Reynolds, the chief
litigator for the United States in opposing petitions presented to the
Court of Private Land Claims. 20 8 Despite that potential conflict of interest,
Reynolds' compilation remained a primary reference source for the Court.
The Court's narrow interpretation of its authority under the 1891 act
represents a departure from an earlier judicial willingness to complete
claims under the new government. In an appeal from the California Land
Claims Commission, for example, the Court asserted that the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo pledged the United States' protection of all rights
of property, legal or equitable, perfect or imperfect, executory or exe-

cuted. 21 0 Just five years later, the Court engaged in a different interpre-

tation of the same treaty. In a decision under the 1891 Act, the Court
determined that the treaty protected inchoate rights only where the claimant "could, by right and not by grace, have demanded that it should
be made perfect by the former government, had the territory not been
acquired by the United States

....

,,2"l
The Court assumed no respon-

sibility for any inequities caused by its interpretation, placing the blame
for non-completion of land grants upon the former government:
It is the duty of a nation receiving a cession of territory to respect
all rights of property as those rights were recognized by the nation
making the cession, but it is no part of its duty to right the wrongs
which the grantor nation may have theretofore committed upon every
individual .212
In sum, the generous promises of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo were
minimized by the passage of increasingly strict implementing statutes and
by a correspondingly rigid judicial interpretation of that legislation.
B.

Federal Legislation and Indian Treaties
The property guarantees of Indian treaties, like those contained in the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, have been rendered less effective by subsequent federal legislation. It is now well established that Congress has
plenary authority over tribal affairs, including the power to abrogate
unilaterally Indian treaties. 2 3 The harshness of that plenary power doctrine
has been softened to some degree by judicially-created canons of
construction 2 4 and by a congressionally-recognized duty to provide monetary compensation for treaty violations. 215 Judicial activism, however,

208. See LAND, WATER AND CULTURE, supra note 18, at 44-45.
209. Id.
210. Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 200-01 (1891) (Field, J., concurring).
211. Ainsa v. United States, 161 U.S. 208, 223 (1896).
212. Cessna v. United States, 169 U.S. 165, 186 (1898) (rejecting land claim, in part because
conditions subsequent were not performed).
213. See infra part IV.B.I.
214. See infra part IV.B.2.
215. See supra notes 42, 80 and accompanying text.
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sporadic, making the courts the "fair-weather friend" of Indian
has been
16
2

tribes.

1. The Plenary Power of Congress to Abrogate Indian Treaties
The "later-in-time" rule of treaty abrogation was first articulated by
the Supreme Court in The Cherokee Tobacc& 7 decision in 1870:
The effect of treaties and acts of Congress, when in conflict, is not
settled by the Constitution. But the question is not involved in any
doubt as to its proper solution. A treaty may supersede a prior act
of Congress, and an act of Congress may supersede a prior treaty.2" 8
The Cherokee Tobacco Court provided little analysis to support its opinion, but relied heavily upon Taylor v. Morton, 219 the decision of a
Massachusetts circuit court.
The rule was amplified by three Supreme Court decisions issued in the
1880s. In the Head Money Cases, the Court provided an institutional
justification for the abrogation of treaty by statute. 220 After observing
that statutes are enacted by the President, the Senate, and the House
of Representatives whereas treaties involve solely the President and the
Senate, the Court concluded that "[i]f there be any difference in this
regard [the relative superiority of treaties and statutes], it would seem
to be in favor of an act in which all three of the bodies participate. ' 22'
Subsequently, Whitney v. Robertson established that courts should attempt
to construe statute and treaty "so as to give effect to both . . . but if

the two are inconsistent, the one last in date will control the other,
' 222
provided the stipulation of the treaty on the subject is self-executing.
The Whitney doctrine was approved by a third decision of the decade,
The Chinese Exclusion Case.223 There, the Court asserted that treaties
can be repealed or modified at the pleasure of Congress, but expressed
confidence that Congress would not pass lightly laws in conflict with
treaty obligations. 224 The Court disclaimed moral responsibility for treaty
violations, asserting that the "[C]ourt is not a censor of the morals of
other departments of the government

....

,,225
Likewise,

the Justices

accepted no political responsibility, claiming that treaty breaches should

216. GETCHES, WILKINSON, & WILLIAMS, supra note 80, at 332.
217. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1870) (holding that a general statute imposing taxes on liquor and
tobacco products applied also to the Cherokee Nation, even if such application would violate a
prior treaty provision).
218. Id. at 621 (citation omitted).
219. 23 F. Cas. 784 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855), aff'd, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 481 (1862).
220. Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
221. Id. at 599.
222. 124 U.S. 190, 194-95 (1888) (despite potential conflict between statute and treaty between
the United States and the Dominican Republic, statutory tax is applicable to imported sugars).
223. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889) (upholding the validity of a
statute prohibiting the entry of Chinese laborers into the United States, where such statute was in
violation of existing treaties between the United States and China).
224. Id. at 600.
225. Id. at 602-03.
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be redressed through international diplomatic channels and not by the
226
domestic courts of the United States.
This congressional authority to abrogate treaties in general is supplemented by an express "plenary power" over Indian affairs in particular. 227
Ironically, the federal interference with Indian treaty rights has evolved
from the United States' protective obligation toward the Indian tribes. 221
In addition, the plenary power doctrine has constitutional underpinnings,
derived from the exclusive congressional authority "[tlo regulate commerce
... with the Indian tribes. ' 229 Together, the later-in-time rule and the
plenary power doctrine have justified, in many cases, the United States'
failure to live up to its treaty promises to Native American tribes.
2.

Judicial Limitation of the Plenary Power Doctrine: The Canons
of Construction
Although the courts have supported the plenary power of Congress,
they have also limited that authority through the development of special
canons for the construction of documents affecting Indian tribes. As
early as 1832, the Court noted that "[tlhe language used in treaties with
the Indians should never be construed to their prejudice. ' 230 Under the
canons, treaties are to be construed liberally, as the Indians would have
understood them. 23 Moreover, ambiguous expressions are to be resolved
in the tribes' favor. 23 2 These unique canons are justified in terms of the
United States' trust obligation toward Native Americans 233 and represent
an attempt to compensate for the vast inequality in bargaining power
during treaty negotiations:
In construing' any treaty between the United States and an Indian
tribe, it must always .

.

. be borne in mind that the negotiations for

the treaty are conducted, on the part of the United States, an enlightened and powerful nation, by representatives skilled in diplomacy,
masters of a written language, understanding the modes and forms

226. Id. at 606. See also Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194-95 (treaty infractions do not involve judicial
questions and remedy must be sought through diplomacy and legislation); Cherokee Tobacco, 78
U.S. at 621 (issue of treaty violations is political question beyond the sphere of judicial cognizance).
227. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) ("[pllenary authority over the tribal
relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning"). See also Warren
Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965); Winton v. Amos, 255 U.S. 373, 39192 (1921); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 478 (1899).
228. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
229. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. See McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164,
172 n.7 (1973) (power of Congress over Indian tribes derives from federal responsibility for regulating
commerce with Indian tribes and for treaty making). But see Reid Peyton Chambers, Judicial
Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213, 1227-29 (1975)
(arguing that the Constitution does not support the plenary power doctrine).
230. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 582 (1832) (McClean, J., concurring).
231. Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 432 (1943).
232. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S.
251 (1992).
233. See, e.g., Choctaw Nation, 318 U.S. at 432 (quoting Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681,
684-85 (1942), treaties should be construed "in a spirit which generously recognizes the full obligation
of this nation to protect the interests of a dependent people").
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of creating the various technical estates known to their law, and
assisted by an interpreter employed by themselves; that the treaty is
drawn up by them and in their own language; that the Indians, on
the other hand, are a weak and dependent people, who have no
written language and are wholly unfamiliar with all the forms of legal
expression, and whose only knowledge of the terms in which the
treaty is framed is that imparted to them by the interpreter employed
by the United States; and that the treaty must therefore be construed,
not according to the technical meaning of its words to learned lawyers,
but in the sense in which they would naturally be understood by the

Indians .234
Although the canons were developed originally for interpretation of treaty
extended also to the interpretation
provisions, their application has been
235
of statutes and executive orders.
Under the canons, then, courts interpret documents that establish Indian
rights broadly, and interpret narrowly provisions that might limit such
rights. 23 6 Where there is a potential conflict between treaty and statute,
the courts painstakingly examine both to determine whether a conflict
actually exists. 237 If so, then treaty provisions may be superseded by
subsequent legislation, but only where Congress has demonstrated clearly
238
Such careful analysis recognizes
its intent to abrogate the relevant treaty.
239
treaties.
Indian
the solemn nature of
Despite this theoretical development of the canons, however, they have
been applied with a judicial vigor that waxes and wanes over time.2M
Often, courts have aggressively interpreted Indian treaties in a manner
favorable to tribal interests. In Leavenworth, Lawrence, & Galveston
R.R. v. United States, for example, the Court refused to find an implied
abrogation of Indian land rights protected by treaty, even though a
subsequent statute granted a portion of those same lands to the state
for railroad purposes.241 In requiring a clear statement from Congress
that abrogation was intended, the Court noted that "Congress cannot
be supposed to have intended [to convey by statute] lands previously
appropriated to another purpose, unless there be an express declaration

234. Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1899). The Meehan Court may have exaggerated the
weakness of the tribes. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
235. CoHrN, supra note 9, at 224 n.60.
236. Id. at 225.
237. See Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 6, at 623 (the later-in-time rule actually resolves few
Indian cases and "the bulk of the analysis revolves around the question of whether a 'conflict'
actually exists"). This detailed analysis occurs even when courts are faced with an "apparent conflict"
between treaty and statute. Id. at 622.
238. Id. at 623-24 (describing various judicial tests employed to determine whether or not a treaty
has been abrogated by statute).
239. See Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942) (treaty obligations impose
"moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust"); Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504,
516 (1896) (treaties should be construed to "uphold the sanctity of the public faith").
240. See Wilkinson & Volkman, Treaty Abrogation, supra note 6, at 645 (the issue of treaty
abrogation has been governed by "ambiguous tests that facilitate contradictory results").
241. 92 U.S. 733, 741-42 (1876).
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to that effect. ' 242 Similarly, Menominee Tribe v. United States protected
Indian treaty rights actively. 243 There, the Court found that a treaty
establishing the Wolf River Reservation "for a home, to be held as
Indian lands are held" impliedly protected Indian hunting and fishing
rights. 2" Moreover, those implied treaty rights were not limited by state
hunting and fishing regulations, even though a federal statute provided
explicitly that "the laws of the several States shall apply to the tribe
and its members in the same manner as they apply to other citizens or
persons within their jurisdiction." 2 4 Under such cases, the Court has
exercised a protective role over the tribes. 246
In other cases, however, legislation was interpreted literally to the
detriment of treaty rights. The Court was particularly passive during the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, during the same period that
the Botiller and Barker decisions severely undermined private property
rights under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. 247 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,
a case decided in 1903, held that Congress could appropriate treaty lands
by statute. 24 In upholding Congress' "full administrative power . . . over
Indian tribal property, ' 249 the Court deferred to Congress:
We must presume that Congress acted in perfect good faith in the
dealings with the Indians of which complaint is made, and that the
legislative branch of the government exercised its best judgment in
the premises. In any event, as Congress possessed full power in the
matter, the judiciary cannot question or inquire into the motives which
prompted the enactment of this legislation. If injury was occasioned
... relief must be sought by an appeal to that body for redress,
250
and not to the courts.
A similarly limited view of tribal rights was adopted in United States v.
Kagama, where a federal statute was construed strictly to terminate tribal
criminal jurisdiction over Indian conduct affecting Indians within Indian
country. 25 For the next half-century, tribal rights were strictly limited
25 2
by legislative enactments.
In conclusion, although both Indian and Hispanic treaty rights are
vulnerable to restrictive federal legislation, special canons of construction
offer limited assistance to Indian tribes in the preservation of treaty
rights. The particularly harsh decisions of the late nineteenth century are

242. Id.
243. 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
244. Id. at 405-06.
245. Id. at 410.
246. See generally Collins, supra note 2, § 57.04(b), at 235 (stating that before 1871, statutory
overrides of treaties were rare).
247. See supra parts IV.A.2.b (discussing Botiller) and IV.A.2.c (discussing Barker).
248. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
249. Id. at 568.
250. Id.
251. 118 U.S. 375 (1886). In Kagama, the Indian rights at issue were derived from inherent tribal
sovereignty rather than from treaty.
252. GETCHS, WILKINSON, & WILLIAMS, supra note 80, at 187 (after Kagama, tribes were viewed
as helpless wards under congressional control).
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consistent with the prevailing national attitude of distrust toward those
of non-European descent. Decisions such as Botiller and Kagama join
253
ranks with relatively contemporaneous cases such as Plessy v. Ferguson,
Dred Scott v. Sandford,25 4 and The Chinese Exclusion Case211 as stark
reminders of a not-so-distant and intolerant past.
V.

COMMUNAL LAND USE AND OWNERSHIP

Although common lands are vitally important to both Indian tribes
and to Hispanic communities, tribal commons received far more extensive
recognition and protection under United States law than did their Hispanic
counterparts.25 6 Even that protection was sporadic, however, as federal
policy toward the tribes vacillated between isolation on reservations and
assimilation through the assignment of individual plots of land. 2 7 For
both groups of commons, federal recognition was at a critical low point
during the late nineteenth century. Through the General Allotment Act
of 1887,258 Congress diminished the tribal land base from 138 million.
acres to 34 million acres.2 5 9 Just ten years later, United States v. SandovaP26
laid the groundwork for a similar devastation of Hispanic community
lands.
Tribal Commons
The group identity of Native Americans has been institutionalized to
a far greater extent than that of any other ethnic minority in the United
States.26' In 1832, Chief Justice Marshall characterized the Cherokee
Nation as a "distinct community, occupying its own territory. '262 The
tribal identity was strengthened, perhaps, by the perception that Indians
263
were incapable of assimilating into the society of their conquerors.
Federal Indian policy has been cyclical. At times, recognition of the
communal nature of Indian life has led to a legal acceptance of common
property rights. Throughout much of the nineteenth century, for example,

A.

253. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding constitutionality of "equal but separate" railroad accommodations for white and black Americans).
254. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (regarding slaves as "property").
255. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889) (forbidding the re-entry of
Chinese immigrants into the United States), discussed in supra part IV.B.1. As noted by one
commentator, the case's "very name is an embarrassment." Louis Henkin, The Constitution and
United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV.
853, 863 (1987).
256. See infra parts V.A - V.C.
257. See infra .part V.A.
258. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388. The Act is discussed in infra part V.A.
259. The statistics represent tribal landholdings in 1887 and 1934, respectively. DESKBOOK, supra
note 64, at 19 n.93 (citing 2 J. PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER 896 (1984)).
260. 167 U.S. 278 (1897). The Sandoval decision is considered in infra part V.B.
261. LAND, WATER, AND CULTURE, supra note 18, at 320-21.
262. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 520 (1832).
263. In 1823, Justice Marshall described the Indians as "a people with whom it was impossible
to mix." Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 590 (1823).
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the federal government promoted the physical and political segregation
of Indian tribes. 264 Numerous treaties set aside lands for exclusive tribal

occupancy, in many instances after the tribes had been "removed"

from

their original territory to make way for the westward tide of Euroamerican
settlement.2 65 By 1880, 113 reservations had been created in states west
of the Mississippi River. 266 On those reservations, property was held in
common tribal ownership and individuals possessed a derivative interest
based upon tribal membership. 267 Critics of the reservation system claimed
that tribal commons were excessive, preventing Native Americans from
acquiring a knowledge of individual property. 26 As a practical matter,
the isolation of tribes on large reservations proved to be unworkable as
non-Indians pushed relentlessly westward, engulfing Indian settlements in
269
their path.
By the late nineteenth century, federal policy no longer favored the
creation of communally-owned reservations. Instead, an allotment policy
developed under which tribal members were given individual parcels of
land and the "surplus" commons were sold to non-Indian purchasers. 270

Initially, tribal lands were allotted to individual Indian members on a

piecemeal basis. 27' With the passage of the General Allotment (Dawes)

Act of

1887,272

the allotment of tribal lands accelerated. Ostensibly created

for the benefit of the Indian people and to promote their civilization,
the allotment policy was more successful in advancing non-Indian interests.
Overall, the experiment was devastating to the tribes, opening up about
two-thirds of all Indian lands to non-Indian settlement. 273

The allotment era came to an end in 1934 with the passage of the

Indian Reorganization Act, 274 legislation designed to revive tribalism and
to encourage self-determination and cultural plurality. The Act attempted
to restore partially the Indian land base that had been dismantled under
allotment practices, providing for the purchase of additional tribal lands. 275

264. See generally I J. PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER (1984) (discussing federal policy toward
Indian tribes); FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN CRISIS: CHRISTIAN REFORMERS
AND THE INDIAN, 1865-1900 (1976).
265. See generally COHEN, supra note 9, at 78-92, 123 (removal and concentration on reservations
were seen as means by which to "civilize" and assimilate the Indian into American life).
266. DESKBOOK, supra note 64, at 14 n.71, (citing PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER, 578-79 (1984)).
267. See Collins, supra note 2, § 57.03(d), at 231, § 57.06(a), at 249-50 (Like other persons in
the United States, Native Americans also have the right to own individual interests in land.). Id.
§ 57.06(a), at 249.
268. COHEN, supra note 9, at 124, (citing COMM'R IND. AFT. ANN. REP., S. EXEC. DOC. No. 1,
35th Cong., 2d Sess. 354 (1858)).
269. See GETCHES, WILKINSON, & WILLIAMS, supra note 80, at 175-80.
270. COHEN, supra note 9, at 127-44.
271. See id. at 129-30. As early as 1633, Indian lands had been allotted to individual owners.
The early experiments with allotment proved to be a failure, as Indians lost their lands through
subsequent sale and/or fraud. Id.
272. 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-34, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349,
354, 381).
273. See GETCHES, WILKINSON, & WILLIAMS, supra note 80, at 175-80.
274. Act of June 18, 1934, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461 et seq.) See generally
COHEN, supra note 9, at 144-52.
275. COHEN, supra note 9, at 147.
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276
The reorganization period was followed by yet more cycles of assimilation

and tribalism.277

Common Lands of Spanish and Mexican Land Grants
, The sharing of common lands was an important custom in New Mexico,
on
an adaptive practice well suited to that isolated, harsh environment
27 In general,
the northern frontier of New Spain, and later, Mexico.
when the Spanish or Mexican government awarded a land grant to a
community of settlers, each member received an allotment of land for
a house, fields for cultivation, and the right to use community lands as
27 9 By the time of the United
a source of water, pasture, wood, and game.
States occupation of New Mexico, over sixty such community grants were
B.

in existence.

210

Although the common lands were clearly granted for community use,
it is not clear whether title passed to the community or remained with

the sovereign. 281 The issue took on a new significance with the United

States' conquest of Mexico because, under international law, Mexico
could cede only sovereign territory that had not been granted previously
to individuals. 28 2 If the commons belonged to the community, then, postconquest title would remain in the community. On the other hand, territory
retained by the Spanish and Mexican governments for communal use
became part of the United States' public domain, even where local
communities had relied for generations on the commons for their subsistence. Scholars disagree as to whether the communities possessed fee
28 4
title 283 or simply a usufructuary right to their commons. In either case,
however, the communities were the intended beneficiaries of the commons:

276. See id. at 152-80 (describing the "termination" period of 1943-61).
277. See id. at 180-207 (describing the "self-determination" period, beginning in 1961).
278. See John R. Van Ness, Hispanic Land Grants, Ecology and Subsistence in the Uplands of
Northern New Mexico and Southern Colorado, in LAND, WATER AND CULTURE, supra note 18, at
141, 204 (describing the Hispanic "community-based agro-pastoral system of subsistence" as "a
remarkable and distinctive adjustment to a very rugged frontier environment"); see also Van Ness,
supra note 194, at 49-50.
279. See Malcolm Ebright, The San Joaquin Grant: Who Owned the Common Lands? A HistoricalLegal Puzzle, 57 N.M. HIST. REV. 1, 6 (1982); LAND, WATER AND CULTURE, supra note 50 at 23.
280. Together, these grants included hundreds of thousands of acres of common lands. Rock,
supra note 186 at 55.
281. "No question has so perplexed both historians and lawyers as ... [the question] under
Spanish law [of] who owned the common lands of a community land grant." Ebright, supra note
279, at 5.
282. See, e.g., Strother v. Lucas, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 410, 437-38 (1838) (under international law,
upon conquest, the King "cedes" only what is his).
283. See Ebright, supra note 279, at 5 (concluding that New Mexican communities owned the
common lands); Van Ness, supra note 194, at 47 (New Mexico grants included "communal landholding
with individual rights of usufruct"); Clark S. Knowlton, The Town of Las Vegas Community Land
Grant: An Anglo-American Coup d- tat, in SPANISH AND MEXICAN LAND GRANTS IN NEW MEXICO
AND COLORADO 16-17 (John R. Van Ness & Christine M. Van Ness eds., 1980) (Spanish and Mexican
law and landholding practices of Spanish-Americans support the view that land grants, including
commonlands, belonged collectively to all grant inhabitants).
284. Rock, supra note 186, at 53 (arguing that New Mexico community lands grant residents
have a usufructuary right to their common lands, with title remaining in the government).
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In Spain both the ungranted crown lands . . . and the common lands
of areas that had been granted to communities in fee and full ownership
were broadly classified as public domain, but the community lands
possessed some qualities of private property so only the [ungranted
crown lands] of the sovereign were truly public domain. Even if only
the usufruct (use) to community lands had been granted, and not its
fee-simple ownership, that type of usufruct is perpetual under normal
circumstances. Either way, the land was strictly set aside for the
common use of the citizens, present and future, of that community
and no other.285

In 1897, the United States Supreme Court tackled the issue of who
owned the common lands. In United States v. Sandoval, s6 the Court
determined that the common lands of the San Miguel del Bado grant
in New Mexico-comprising over 300,000 acres-belonged to the United
States government and not to the community that had settled on the
grant more than ninety years previously. 287 Although the town's outer
boundaries had been established by a valid land grant, the Court construed
the title to all common lands within those boundaries as inchoate, unless
and until such commons were allotted to a particular individual. 28 Based
upon a narrow construction of its jurisdiction under the Court of Land
Claims Act, 2 9 the Court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to confirm
the incomplete grant of such common lands. 290 The Sandoval judgment
set an important precedent. Prior to the decision, community title to
common lands had been confirmed for some
twelve land grants. 291 After
Sandoval, the claims court rejected all community land grants presented
for confirmation. 292 As a result, the United States acquired immense tracts
of land in which Mexican citizens possessed a strong equitable, if not
legal, interest. Sandoval and its progeny have been criticized for per-

285. WESTPHALL, supra note 48, at 10. See also Vernon Irrigation Co. v. City of Los Angeles,
39 P. 762, 765 (Cal. 1895) ("Whether, under the Mexican system, any title [to common lands]
was
vested in the pueblos, or the title remained in the nation, with power in the [government officials]
to administer the properties, is now immaterial. In either event, the mode adopted was a proper
mode to preserve the equity which it is agreed the pueblos had in the lands set aside and devoted
to the use of the pueblo.").
286. 167 U.S. 278 (1897).
287. The 315,300 acre San Miguel del Bado grant was made in 1794; possession of the grant
was delivered in 1803. Id., at 279, 295. Of the 315,300 acres, the Court confirmed title to only
5,207 acres. LAND, WATER, AND CULTURE, supra note 18, at 46-47.
288. Sandoval, 167 U.S. at 293-98 (discussing the nature of incomplete property rights and
concluding that "unallotted lands were subject to the disposition of the government").
289. The Act required, inter alia, that the court should not allow imperfect claims unless the
claimant would have had a lawful right against Spain or Mexico to make the grant perfect. See
supra part IV.A.3.
290. Sandoval, 167 U.S. at 298 (Court of Private Land Claims not empowered to recognize title
to incomplete land grants).
291. Van Ness & Van Ness, Introduction, in SPANISH AND MEXICAN LAND GRANTS IN NEW MEXICO
AND COLORADO 3, 10 (1980); See, e.g., Cubero Land Grant v. DeSoto,
76 N.M. 490, 416 P.2d
155 (N.M. 1966) (concerning Cubero community land grant).
292. LAND, WATER AND CULTURE, supra note 18, at 47. See, e.g., Rio Arriba Land & Cattle
Co. v. United States, 167 U.S. 298 (1897) (declining to confirm the common lands of the 472,764
acre Cation de Chama Grant in New Mexico).
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petuating the "striking misconception" that the Anglo-American concept
of individual fee-simple ownership should be projected onto "a legal
and the
system which emphasizes community ownership of commonlands
2 93
importance of local custom in establishing legal precedents."
The story of the commons is not simply a matter of historic interest.
To this day, the commons remain a central component of rural Hispanic
communities in New Mexico and Colorado, as well as an important
symbol of cultural survival. In Costilla County, Colorado, for example,
more than a
Hispanic settlers shared a 77,000 acre mountain tract for
29 4 For the past
century for grazing, hunting, fishing, and wood-gathering.
defend
thirty years, they have been involved in litigation in an attempt to
295 In an
custom.
and
their right to the land based upon Mexican law
emotional political campaign that complements their legal efforts, the
county's Hispanic residents have asserted that their "sacred right" to use
the mountain commons is essential to "the right to exist and [to] the
preservation of a culture and a way of life that has persisted . . . for

nearly 150 years.

''296

The Commons Revisited: Adverse Possession
The relative degree to which modern Indian and Hispanic communities
are perceived as distinct legal entities capable of common land ownership
is illustrated concisely by two federal court decisions on the law of adverse
easement through
possession. In one, an Indian tribe was awarded an
297 In that case, the
use.
tribal
regular
of
basis
the
on
property
private
court presumed without extensive analysis that the tribe functioned as a
was sufficiently
unit and that tribal possession of the disputed land
"exclusive" to satisfy the relevant state requirement. 298 In the other case,
a community of Hispanic farmers was unable to maintain title to its
traditional common land, despite continuous adverse use for over a
C.

293. LAND, WATER AND CULTURE, supra note 18, at 3, 8. Several years before Sandoval, the
California Supreme Court noted the "startling" difference between the American system of "reduc[ing] everything to private ownership from which a profit can be made" and the Mexican system
where "[slo far as communal ownership would answer the purpose of the community, it was
preferred." Vernon Irrigation Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 39 P. at 766 (discussing riparian water
rights).
294. Sanchez v. Taylor, 377 F.2d 733, 738 (10th Cir. 1967). See Becky Rumsey, A lost land
grant: Can it be reclaimed?, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Oct. 18, 1993, at 1.
in
295. See generally Sanchez, 377 F.2d 733 (Hispanic residents asserted community land rights
defense to a quiet title action); Rael v. Taylor, 876 P.2d 1210 (Colo. 1994) (claiming common
usufructuary rights in mountain tract and alleging that Sanchez v. Taylor suffered from various
procedural defects).
296. Descendants of Colorado's First Settlers Look to Nation for Support, LA SIERRA, Spring
1994, at 1.
297. Zuni Tribe of New Mexico v. Platt, 730 F. Supp. 318 (D. Ariz. 1990) (awarding prescriptive
easement to tribe based upon two-day pilgrimage every four years to sacred mountain area located
on private land).
298. Id. at 323 (applying state adverse possession law and finding that "it is reasonable to conclude
that if people are occupying a tract of land at a particular time, another person or other people,
cannot simultaneously occupy the same space").
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century. 299 There, the court presumed that the community was a collection
of individuals rather than a legal unit. 3°° Accordingly, the community's
claim of adverse possession was denied because "usage in common" was
insufficient for the acquisition of rights in another's land by custom or
common prescription.301
VI.

THE OWNERSHIP OF SUBMERGED LANDS

At the time the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and Indian treaties were
drafted, it is likely that the negotiators were not concerned excessively
with the ownership of land beneath streams and tidal waters. Because
the young nation was rich in rivers, coastline, and their associated resources, there was no pressing need to determine the title to submerged
lands. Thus, land boundaries were described often in general terms such
as "by the bay, ' 30 2 "bounded . . . by the Columbia River," 3 03 or "west
by the anchorage for ships" 3°4 which were ambiguous descriptions that
left unresolved the ownership of submerged lands. Later, upon the discovery of valuable mineral deposits in streambeds and as fishery resources
became scarce, the title to long-settled properties became the subject of
litigation. 0 5
In the United States legal tradition, there is a strong presumption
against the private ownership of lands underlying major waterways. Due
to the important public interest in maintaining navigation and related
activities, watercourses are held generally as commons, with the states
maintaining title on behalf of all their citizens. °6 With respect to the
original thirteen states,
when the Revolution took place, the people of each state became
themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to
all their navigable waters and the soils under them for their own
common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the
Constitution to the general government. 07

299. See generally Sanchez, 377 F.2d 733 (discussed in supra notes 294-95 and accompanying
text). The Sanchez defendants claimed a right to the commons under the alternative theories of
adverse possession and Mexican law doctrines. Sanchez, 377 F.2d at 734.
300. See id. at 738.
301. Id. The Sanchez court denied the adverse possession claim, in part, because "others" were
making similar claims and uses to the common lands. Id. The court did not explain, however,
whether those "others" were members of the general public or simply part of the land grant's
original settlers and their descendants.
302. See United States v. Pacheco, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 587 (1864) (describing Indian treaty lands).
303. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 2 (1894) (describing Indian treaty lands).
304. United States v. Coronado Beach Co., 255 U.S. 472, 487 (1921) (boundary described by
1846 Mexican land grant).
305. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988) (dispute over title to
streambeds from which oil and gas were-produced); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981)
(dispute over title to riverbed and ability to regulate its fishery).
306. See generally Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts
on the Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425 (1989) (describing public
values in water).
307. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842). The states "surrendered" to the
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Later, as the United States gained additional territory, new states were
admitted to the union on an "equal footing" with the original thirteen
title to the beds and shores of navigable waters
states, acquiring a similar
30 8
within their borders.
Prior to the admission of new states into the union,3° 9 the federal
Thus, subgovernment held territorial lands in trust for future states.
merged lands could not be conveyed into private ownership, except in
a limited range of circumstances. The310Supreme Court delineated three
such exceptions in Shively v. Bowlby:
We cannot doubt, therefore, that Congress has the power to make
grants of lands below the high water mark of navigable waters in
any Territory of the United States, whenever it becomes necessary to
do so in order to perform international obligations, or to effect the
improvement of such lands for the promotion and convenience of
commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, or to
to objects for which the
carry out other public purposes appropriate
3'
Territory.
the
hold
States
United
The international obligation exception has been applied by the Supreme
Court to uphold the validity of Spanish and Mexican land grants pur-

"general" or federal government such rights as the power to control navigation and commerce.
See Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 271-72 (1897) ("although title to the shore and submerged
soil is in the various states, all navigable waters are under the control of the United States for the
purpose of regulating and improving navigation").
the
308. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 230 (1845) ("The new states have
under
soils
the
and
waters,
navigable
of
shores
[the
over
jurisdiction
same rights, sovereignty, and
(under
them] as the original states"); Mumford v. Wardwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 423, 436 (1867)
and
the equal-footing doctrine, "the new States since admitted have the same rights, sovereignty
jurisdiction . . . as the original States possess within their respective borders"); Oregon v. Corvallis
is
Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 374 (1976) (states' title to lands underlying navigable waters
"exconferred not by Congress, "but by the constitution itself"). For commentary regarding the
traordinary" nature of this now-settled doctrine, see Wilkinson, supra note 306, at 448 ("We need
to appreciate how extraordinary it was for the Court to be so activist [in recognizing broad ownership
and
rights of states as to lands under navigable watercourses], to make so many leaps of doctrine,
finally to embed this far-flung implied land transfer to the states as a constitutional mandate").
In general, state ownership of submerged lands is governed by the "navigable in fact" test:
Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are navigable
in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of
being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which
trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and
travel on water.
The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870). The Daniel Ball test has been interpreted
and
broadly. See Johnston & Austin, Recreational Rights and Titles to Beds on Western Lakes
Streams, 7 NAT. REs. J. 1, 24-25 (1967).
rev'd
309. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Prop., 644 P.2d 792, 797 (1982),
on other grounds, Summa Corp. v. California State Lands Comm'n, 466 U.S. 198 (1984).
310. 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
the states'
311. Id. at 27-28 (emphasis added). Under a related theory, the public trust doctrine,
R.R. v.
ability to convey submerged lands into private ownership is limited. See Illinois Central
to railroad
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 454 (1892) (Illinois revokes waterfront grant of over 100 acres
Sax, The
company on basis that such lands were held in trust for the people of the state); Joseph
MICH. L. REV.
68
Intervention,
Judicial
Effective
Law:
Resource
Natural
in
Doctrine
Trust
Public
471 (1970).
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porting to convey tidal lands into private ownership.3 12 No such exception
has been applied consistently to Indian treaties.
A.

The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and Submerged Lands
Just as United States courts interpreted Spanish and Mexican law in

a manner that disfavored the common use and ownership of land,313 so

also did they decline to recognize an aquatic commons. Despite considerable evidence that Spanish and Mexican law provided at least some
protection of tidelands as a public commons,3 4 American courts consistently upheld private claims to such lands based upon Hispanic land
grants. Because the rights of the public were generally not considered in
the original land grant confirmation proceedings,3"5 controversy over title
to lands beneath watercourses often did not erupt until many years later
when a state, on behalf of its citizens, claimed some interest in grant
lands. By that time, many of the contested lands had passed out of
Hispanic ownership. Ironically, therefore, the courts' generosity and concern with the fulfillment of treaty promises often served to benefit
corporations or cities, rather than the descendants of the original ben-

eficiaries of the treaty.3 16 In a line of cases concerning Mexican land

grants in California, the Supreme Court has recognized private rights in
tidal lands, free of any easement or servitude in favor of the public. In
a few of those cases, the Court has based its holding directly upon an
interpretation of Mexican law. In Arguello v. United States, the Court
determined that Mexican law did not forbid coastal land grants to Mexican

312. See infra part VI.A.
313. See infra part V.B.
314. See Hope M. Babcock, Has the U.S. Supreme Court Finally Drained the Swamp of Takings
Jurisprudence?: The Impact of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council on Wetlands and Coastal
Barrier Beaches, 19 HAv. ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 39 n.221 (1995) (in the context of water rights,
asserting that Spanish and Mexican law extended the public trust doctrine to tidelands, pueblo
common lands, and to fresh waters flowing through the pueblo); Jan S. Stevens, The Public Trust:
A Sovereign's Ancient Prerogative Becomes the People's Environmental Right, 14 U.C. DAvis 195,
197 (1980) (Spanish and Mexican law recognized the principle that "[elvery man has a right to use
the rivers for commerce and fisheries, to tie up to the banks, and to land cargo and fish on them");
Dion G. Dyer, Comment, California Beach Access: The Mexican Law and the Public Trust, 2
ECOLOGY L.Q. 571, 600-11 (1972). See also Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Webb, 618 So.2d
1381, 1383 (Fla. App. 1993) (under the law of Spain as it existed in 1817, submerged lands were
held as res communes for the public use and could not be conveyed into private ownership without
a "clear showing of express sovereign intent"); National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of
Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (Spanish and Mexican law recognized that the sovereign
owns navigable waterways and underlying lands as trustee of a public trust for the benefit of the
people); State v. Balli, 190 S.W.2d 71, 110 (Tex. 1945) (Sharp, J., dissenting) (under Mexican law,
settlement of coastline not encouraged and the coast, and ten littoral leagues inland was reserved
from colonization, "except by consent of the general government of Mexico"); Apalachicola Land
& Dev. v. McRae, 98 So. 505, 523-24 (Fla. 1923) (under Spanish law, navigable waters were public
and their waters and beds were not conveyed into private ownership).
315. City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Prop., 644 P.2d 792, 798 (Cal. 1982), rev'd on
other grounds, Summa Corp. v. California State Lands Comm'n, 466 U.S. 198 (1984).
316. See, e.g., Summa Corp. v. California, 466 U.S. 198 (1984) (recognizing corporation's right
to tidelands); City of San Francisco v. LeRoy, 138 U.S. 656 (1891) (recognizing the City of San
Francisco's right to tidelands).
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citizens.31 Despite the fact that relevant Mexican law forbade clearly the
colonization of any territory within ten leagues of the sea-coast without
8
the approval of the supreme executive power," the Court determined
that such prohibition applied only to "foreigners" and not to Mexican
citizens:
But while a judicious policy might forbid the settlement of large
bodies of foreigners on the boundaries and sea-coast, we cannot impute
to [the Mexican government] the weakness, or folly, of confining their
native citizens to the interior, 19 and thus leaving their sea-coast a
wilderness without population.
Although that interpretation of Mexican law was supported by little more
should have been,320
than the Court's perception of what Mexican policy
2
a
it served as a guide for future judicial decisions. '
More commonly, however, the Court has avoided such an inquiry into
the substance of Mexican law, upholding submerged land grants under
a variety of legal theories.322 In some cases, the Court applied the Shiveley
international obligation rationale321 Under that view, courts distinguish
between tidelands that passed from federal to state ownership for the
benefit of the public, and tidelands that never passed into federal ownership because they had been granted previously by the Mexican government to private parties. In the latter case, the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo imposes an international obligation upon the United States to
confirm such land grants, rather than to hold them in trust for future
states. 324
In other cases, the Court has been unwilling to disturb confirmed
Mexican grants of tidal lands based upon the policy of promoting the

317. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 539 (1855) (appeal from original land grant confirmation proceeding
under California land act). See supra part IV.A.2 for a discussion of the California Act.
318. Arguello, 59 U.S. at 547. For a complete translation of the Mexican Colonization Law of
August 18, 1824, see ROSE HOLLENBAUGH AVINA, SPANISH AND MEXICAN LAND GRANTS IN CALIFORNIA
Appendix C (1932).
319. Arguello, 59 U.S. at 547.
320. In dissent, Justice Daniel accused the Court of violating the acknowledged laws and authority
of the Mexican government and of "inciting and pampering a corrupt and grasping spirit of
speculation and monopoly." Id. at 549 (Daniel, J., dissenting).
321. See, e.g., United States v. Coronado Beach Co., 255 U.S. 472 (1921) (fifth section of the
Mexican Colonization Act applies only to foreigners and not to Mexican citizens).
322. See Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Lands Comm'n, 466 U.S. 198, 201 n.l (1984)
("While it is beyond cavil that we may take a fresh look at what Mexican law may have been in
1839, we find it unnecessary to determine whether Mexican law imposed [an easement in favor of
public rights in the tidelands] on grants of private property" (citations omitted)).
323. See supra notes 310-12 and accompanying text.
324. See, e.g., Borax Consol., Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 15 (1935) (dicta) (the
United States held tidelands acquired from Mexico in trust for future states, except for "lands
which had previously been granted by Mexico to other parties or subjected to trusts which required
a different disposition,-a limitation resulting from the duty resting upon the United States under
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo . . . to protect all rights of property which had emanated from
the Mexican Government prior to the treaty"). See also Summa Corp. v. California, 466 U.S. 198,
205 (1984); United States v. Coronado Beach Co., 255 U.S. 472, 487-88 (1921); Knight v. United
States Land Assoc., 142 U.S. 161, 183-84 (1891); San Francisco v. Le Roy, 138 U.S. 656, 670-71
(1891).
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certainty of property rights.325 That certainty should be maintained, said
the Court, even where the United States may have confirmed erroneously
a grant in excess of that which would have been allowed by the Mexican
government. In United States v. CoronadoBeach Co.,326 the Court rejected
a collateral attack upon title to submerged lands, allegedly confirmed in
contravention of Mexican law. The Court's opinion, written by Justice
Holmes, was pragmatic in tone:
The question whether there was such a prior grant and what were
its boundaries were questions that had to be decided in the proceedings
for confirmation and there was jurisdiction 3to
27 decide them as well
if the decision was wrong as if it was right.
Justice Holmes concluded that it was "too late" to challenge the title,
even though the grant may well have been construed more narrowly in
the original patent proceedings.328
Most recently, the Court has protected Mexican grants to tidal lands
by extending the doctrine of Barker v. Harvey32 9 to the states. Barker
had held that the Mission Indians had abandoned all land claims derived
from the Mexican government for failure to present those claims before
the California board of land commissioners for confirmation.3 0 Similarly,
Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Lands Comm'n. held that the
State of California had no right to claim an easement over lagoon property
that had been confirmed previously by the United States to the owner
of a Mexican land grant in a proceeding in which the state had not
" ' As
participated. 33
a result, the City of Los Angeles, as successor to
California's alleged interest, could not dredge the lagoon and make other
improvements to petitioner's property without exercising its power of
eminent domain and compensating the landowner for such activities.33 2
In a holding that was reversed by the Summa Court, the California
Supreme Court had found that the conveyance of tidelands into absolute
private ownership was contrary to Mexican law in general and to the
Summa grant in particular. The public had a right to the use of tidelands,
said the state court, in accordance with Las Siete Partidas, the Mexican
law in effect at the time California was governed by Mexico:333
325. See, e.g., Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 190 (1891) (Field, J., concurring)
(reconsidering confirmed Mexican land grants would "lead to great litigation in the State, to the
serious detriment of its interests and those of its people").
326. 255 U.S. 472 (1921).
327. Id. at 487-88.
328. Id. See also Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Lands Comm'n, 466 U.S. 198, 206
(1984) (an overriding purpose of the California confirmation proceedings was to provide repose to
land titles originating with Mexican grants).
329. 181 U.S. 481 (1901) (discussed in supra part IV.A.2.c.).
330. See supra part IV.A.2.c.
331. 466 U.S. at 198, 209 (1984), rev'g, City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Properties, 644
P.2d 792 (Cal. 1982). Although the Court's decision purported to protect Mexican land grants, the
primary beneficiary of the Court's ruling was Howard Hughes, the owner of the Summa Corporation.
See Summa Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 540 A.2d 403, 404 (Del. 1988) (Summa Corp. is
the successor-in-interest to Toolco, an enterprise wholly owned by Howard Hughes).
332. 446 U.S. at 200.
333. Venice Peninsula Prop., 644 P.2d at 797.
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The things which belong in common to the creatures of this world
are the following, namely, the . .. sea and its shores, for every living
creature can use each of these things according as it has need of
them. For this reason every man can use the sea and its shore for
doing everything there which he
fishing or for navigation, and for
33 4
thinks may be to his advantage.
Furthermore, the Mexican government had imposed a servitude upon
petitioner's land grant, allowing the grantee to enclose the lands only if
such enclosure was "without prejudice to the traversing roads and servitudes." 3" The Summa Court did not disturb the state court's interpretation of Mexican law, but merely suggested in a footnote that such
law was irrelevant to its decision.116 The Court concluded that even if
the disputed property had been subject to a public easement under Mexican
law, "the State's claim to such a servitude must have been presented in
the federal patent proceeding in order to survive the issue of a fee
patent.' ,

The Summa decision may have far-reaching consequences. In California,
over ten million acres of prime real estate trace their title to Mexican
land grants.33 8 At the same time, the California Supreme Court has reacted
to growing public pressure by aggressively asserting a "public trust"
interest in tidelands and navigable waters on behalf of its citizens.3 9 The
future conflicts
combination of these two factors is certain to produce
34
similar to those underlying the Summa litigation. 1
Indian Treaties and Submerged Lands
Under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo and its implementing legislation, title derived from Hispanic land
grants to submerged lands has been protected, even where such protection
may be contrary to Mexican law and where its beneficiaries are not those
specifically protected by the treaty.3 41 In contrast, Indian title to submerged
lands has rarely been recognized, even where applicable treaties established

B.

334. Id. at 797 n.8 (citing Las Siete Partidas, Law III, Title XXVIII. The Court also took note
of Law VI, under which "Rivers, harbors, and public highways belong to all persons in common
. . . .

.).

335. Id. According to expert testimony, that reservation preserved the rights of the public in
tidelands. Id.
336. 466 U.S. at 201 n.l.
337. Id. at 201.
338. Id. at 202.
339. See City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Prop., 644 P.2d 792, 803-04 (Cal. 1982)
(Richardson, J., dissenting), rev'd on other grounds, Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Lands
Comm'n, 466 U.S. 198 (1984).
340. See Federico M. Cheever, Comment, A New Approach to Spanish and Mexican Land Grants
and the Public Trust Doctrine: Defining the Property Interest Protected by the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo, 33 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1364, 1372-73 (1986) (describing Summa as "the first convergence
of the public trust doctrine and the protected interest of Spanish and Mexican land grant titleholders"
and predicting that "[it is not likely to be the last"). See also Eric T. Freyfogle, Context and
Accommodation in Modern Property Law, 41 ST. L. REv. 1529, 1553, 1556 n.107 (1989) (citing
Summa as a rebuke against California courts' "aggrandizing behavior").
341. See supra part VL.A

Spring 1996]

TREA TIES OF CONQUEST

clearly the expectation that such lands would be owned by the tribes.3 42
The central issue in the determination of ownership of aquatic lands
is whether the United States intended to convey title to a particular
tribe. 43 There is a strong presumption against such intent "unless ...
definitely declared or otherwise made very plain." 344 In only two cases
has the United States Supreme Court upheld tribal ownership of submerged
lands. First, Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma3 45 recognized Indian title to
lands underlying navigable portions of the Arkansas River in Oklahoma3a4
based in part upon treaty language guaranteeing that "no part of the
land granted to [the Choctaw Nation] shall ever be embraced in any
Territory or State ' 3 47 and promising that the granted lands would constitute "a permanent home ... which shall, under the most solemn
guarantee of the United States, be, and remain, theirs forever

....

,,34

The Court interpreted that treaty language in accordance with the precept
that treaties should be interpreted as the tribes would have understood
them, with doubtful expressions resolved in the Indians' favor.349 Particularly influential were the unique circumstances under which the Oklahoma reservation had been established, including several bungled attempts
by the federal government to remove and relocate the Cherokee and
Choctaw Nations to western lands beyond the reach of Euroamerican
settlement. 50 Taken together, the treaty language and the circumstances
of negotiation demonstrated that the United States intended to convey
title of the Arkansas riverbed to the Indian nations.35 ' Second, in Alaska
Pacific Fisheries v. United States,35 2 the Supreme Court recognized that
the Annette Islands Indian reservation off the coast of Alaska included
adjacent submerged lands. 53 In protecting the Indians' exclusive right to
the fishery, the Court noted that the United States had been aware that
fishing was the Indians' primary means of subsistence at the time of
35 4
treaty negotiation.

342. See Collins supra note 2, § 57.05(b), at 246-47 (describing tribal expectation that property
encompassed by treaty reservations included watercourses).
343. See Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 633 (1970).
344. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55 (1926).
345. 397 U.S. 620 (1970).
346. The real interest at stake was the ownership of minerals beneath the river bed. Id. at 621.
347. Id. at 625, 635 (quoting the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, Sept. 27, 1830, 7 Stat. 33334).
348. Id. at 624 (quoting Treaty of May 6, 1828 with the Cherokee Nation, 7 Stat. 311).
349. Id. at 631.
350. Id. at 622-28, 634 (courts not required to blind themselves to the circumstances of the grant
in determining the intent of the grantor). See generally COHEN, supra note 9, at 120-55 (discussion
of the United States' removal policy).
351. Choctaw Nation, 397 U.S. at 620-21. Choctaw Nation has been described as a "singular
exception" and its "very peculiar circumstances" were distinguished in Montana v. United States,
450 U.S. 544, 555-56 n.5 (1981).
352. 248 U.S. 78 (1918).
353. Id. at 89.
354. Id. at 88-89. Alaska Pacific Fisheries has been applied by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
See Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Trans-Canada Enter. Ltd., 713 F.2d 455, 457 (1983) (per curiam)
(citing Puyallup), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984) ; Puyallup Indian Tribe v. Port of Tacoma,
717 F.2d 1251, 1258 (9th Cir. 1983) (inferring intent to convey submerged lands where grant to

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

Choctaw Nation and Alaska Pacific Fisheries are two limited exceptions
to the general presumption against pre-statehood federal grants of submerged lands.355 The usual rule was followed in Montana v. United
States,3 5 6 where the Court found that the Crow Tribe of Montana did
not own the bed of the Big Horn River, even though the river lay within
reservation boundaries and relevant treaties had set aside land for exclusive
Indian use in terms arguably as strict as the treaties construed in Choctaw

Nation. 57 Eschewing reliance on the canons of construction employed in
Choctaw Nation,358 the Montana Court held that the Crow treaties failed
to overcome the presumption that the beds of navigable waters remain

in trust for future states. 59

In some cases, the Court has acknowledged that tribal land rights
antedate the United States' acquisition of Indian territory and, therefore,
that treaty lands are a reservation by the tribes, and not a grant to the
tribes by the United States. 6° However, the court has construed those
reservations narrowly, presuming that tribal submerged lands passed into
federal ownership, absent explicit federal intent to the contrary. This
judicial inquiry focuses upon the intent of the United States as grantee,
61
ignoring the intention of the tribe as grantor.3 This reversal of ordinary
tribe included a navigable water within its boundaries and tribe was dependent on fishery resource
for its survival), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984) ; Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v.
Namen, 665 F.2d 951, 952 (9th Cir.) (lands beneath southern portion of Flathead Lake in Montana
included in Flathead Indian reservation where tribe was heavily dependent on fishing for its subsistence), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 977 (1982); Skokomish Indian Tribe v. France, 320 F.2d 205 (9th
Cir. 1963); but see United States v. Aam, 887 F.2d 190, 194, 196-97 (9th Cir. 1989) (tidelands not
conveyed where fishery, although important to tribe at time reservation was created, did not supply
a "significant portion of the tribe's fishery needs"); United States v. Aranson, 696 F.2d 654, 666
(9th Cir. 1983) (tribes assume burden of persuasion that they "depended heavily" on the disputed
body of water for subsistence).
355. See United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55 (1926) ("[T]he United States early
adopted and constantly has adhered to the policy of regarding lands under navigable waters in
acquired territory, while under its sole dominion, as held for the ultimate benefit of future states,
and so has refrained from making any disposal thereof, save in exceptional instances when impelled
to particular disposals by some international duty or public exigency.").
356. 450 U.S. 544, 554 (1981).
357. See supra note 347-48. In Montana, treaties provided that the Crow Reservation "shall be
... set apart for the [tribe's] absolute and undisturbed use and occupation." Montana, 450 U.S.
at 548. In addition, the United States "solemnly agree[d] [that unauthorized persons would never]
be permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in [the reservation]." Id. at 553-54.
358. See supra note 349 and accompanying text. Justice Stevens, in concurrence, stated that the
canons of construction do not exempt Indian reservations from the strong presumption against
dispositions by the United States of land under navigable waters in the territories. Montana, 450
U.S. at 567-68. See supra part IV.B.2 for a general discussion of the canons of construction.
359. Montana, 450 U.S. at 553. The Court stated that the "mere fact that the bed of a navigable
water lies within the boundaries described in the treaty does not make the riverbed part of the
conveyed land, especially when there is no express reference to the riverbed that might overcome
the presumption against its conveyance." Id. at 554. The Court also declined to adopt the treaties'
most literal reading. Id. at 555 ("whatever [the treaties] seem to mean literally, [they] do not give
the Indians the exclusive right to occupy all the territory within the described boundaries").
360. Id. at 554 (Crow treaty "reserve[d] in a general way for the continued occupation of the
Indians what remained of their aboriginal territory") (quoting United States v. Holt Bank, 270
U S. 55, 58 (1926)).
361. Ordinarily, courts consider the intent of both parties when construing the scope of a grant
of land from one party to another. See generally ROGERA. CUNNINGHAM, WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK,
DALE A. WmTMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.1 (1993) (the parties' intent is the touchstone for
determining the scope of a grant).
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roles can be explained, perhaps, by the established principle that original
Indian title is less than full fee simple ownership and is subject to the
ultimate dominion of the federal government.3 62 Unlike its treatment of
Hispanic land grants, therefore, the United States has acknowledged no
obligation to recognize the tribes' pre-existing claims to submerged lands.
VII.

CONTINUING PROTECTION OF TREATY LANDS FROM
STATE AND PRIVATE INTERFERENCE
Federal promises to respect Hispanic and tribal property would be of
little practical significance if treaty lands were lost subsequently to state
and private ownership. Native American territory was insulated from
such non-federal interference through a series of federal trade and intercourse statutes and by application of the federal trust duty.3 63 Under
such legal theories, certain tribal land claims remained viable even after
over a century of non-use. In contrast, Spanish and Mexican land grants
received a more limited degree of federal protection. Although many
confirmed grants were shielded from collateral attack and from adverse
claims initiated during the pendency of title confirmation proceedings, 3 64
others were lost after only a few years of non-use under state doctrines
such as adverse possession, laches, and statutes of limitation.165
A.

Limited Protection of Spanish and Mexican Land Grants

1. The Diminishing Protection of Federal Legislation
The adjudication of Spanish and Mexican land grants was often a
lengthy process. 36 From the time the United States acquired Mexican
territory until the conclusion of those title proceedings, competing claims
to the same property might be established by virtue of possession or
under a purported grant from the federal government. Absent legislative
or judicial protection, the owner of a confirmed land grant might be
forced to bear the expense of additional litigation in order to defend his
or her newly-confirmed title against those competing claims. Judicial
interpretation of the treaty's implementing legislation ameliorated that
problem to some extent. Over time, that judicial protection became more
limited in scope. Under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the California land act, property claimed under an Hispanic land grant was
reserved from disposition under the United States land laws pending
adjudication of the grant. Section thirteen of the Act declared that all
Spanish and Mexican land claims not presented within two years for

362. See supra part II.A.
363. See infra part'VII.B.
364. See infra part VII.A.I.
365. See infra part VII.A.2. Those state doctrines reward settled expectations based upon possession.
See Lewis v. Marshall, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 470, 476-77 (1831).
366. The three methods established by Congress for the confirmation of land grants are discussed
in supra part IV.A.
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adjudication should "be deemed, held, and considered to be a part of
the public domain of the United States. 3 67 In an extraordinary bit of
judicial activism, the Court, in Newhall v. Sanger, converted that limitation into a land grant protection.3 68 Newhall held that Section thirteen
''was notice to all the world that lands in California were held in reserve
to afford a reasonable time to the claimant under an asserted Mexican
or Spanish grant to maintain his rights before the [California Land Claims
Commission]." 3 69 Based upon that interpretation, the Court invalidated
a portion of an explicit federal grant to the Western Pacific Railroad
Company made while an overlapping land grant was sub judice.170 The
Court stated that during the adjudication of any lands claimed under a
foreign grant, such lands could not be disposed of by the federal government, even where the foreign land claim was later determined to be
unfounded or fraudulent.3 71 In New Mexico, the treaty's implementing
legislation presaged the Newhall holding. 72 Section eight of the legislation
establishing the Office of the Surveyor General provided that "until the
final action of Congress on [claims derived under Spanish and Mexican
land grants], all lands covered thereby shall be reserved from sale or

other disposal by the government

. . . .

7

That policy of withdrawal

was reversed by the 1891 legislation creating the Court of Private Land
Claims.3 74 Subsequently, hundreds of Mexican grants became subject to

attack .171
The vulnerability of land grants did not end upon title confirmation,
as numerous collateral attacks challenged the validity of confirmed titles.
The Court consistently deflected those attacks, thus promoting important
policy considerations:
If parties asserting interests in lands acquired since the acquisition of
the country could deny and controvert this record [confirming Mexican
land grants], and compel the patentee, in every suit for his land, to
establish the validity of his claim, his right to its confirmation, and
the correctness of the action of the tribunals and officers of the

367. 9 Stat. 633 (Mar. 3, 1851).
368. 92 U.S. 761 (1875).
369. Id. at 763.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 764-65. See also Southern Pacific R.R. v. United States, 200 U.S. 354, 357 (1906)
(property encompassed by pending land grants was withdrawn from disposition and could not be
the subject of a federal railroad grant). The Court's generous interpretation of section 13 as a
reservation of grant lands was counterbalanced by its view that section 13 required the adjudication
of perfect, as well as inchoate, land grants. See supra part IV.A.2.
372. See supra part IV.A.3 for a general discussion of the New Mexico Act.
373. 26 Stat. 308, 309. See Cameron v. United States, 148 U.S. 301, 310 (1893) (statute withdraws
from disposition lands that are the subject of pending confirmation proceedings).
374. Lockhart v. Johnson, 181 U.S. 516, 523 (1901) (neither treaty nor statute reserve lands
claimed under a Spanish or Mexican land grant from entry and sale under the United States public
land laws pending resolution of land grant claims). See discussion supra part IV.A.3.
375. See O'Donnell v. United States, 91 F.2d 14, 45 (9th Cir. 1936) (Haney, J., dissenting) rev'd
303 U.S. 501 (1938).
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United States in the location of the same, the patent would fail to
be . . . an instrument of quiet and security to its possessor.176

In California, federal legislation provided that land grants confirmed
pursuant to the Act's procedures "shall be conclusive between the United
States and the said claimants only, and shall not affect the interests of

third persons.

'3 77

The Court interpreted narrowly the reference to "third

persons" such that legal challenges to a confirmed land grant could be
maintained only by those claiming title under a prior Spanish or Mexican

land grant.3 7 Excluded from the definition of "third person" were Indian
3

tribes,

79

the states, 8 0 and those claiming under a grant from the United

States government. 38 1 A similarly protective stance was adopted with
3 2
respect to land grants in the Territory of New Mexico.

2.

1

Non-Use of Confirmed Lands Grants

The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo is ambiguous with respect to the
degree of protection afforded Mexican property. On the one hand, the
treaty recognizes absentee landownership and provides that the property
of such landowners would be "inviolably respected." 3
Other treaty
language, however, suggests that Mexican property is entitled to no special
protection beyond that given to United States citizens:
The present owners, the heirs of these, and all Mexicans who may
hereafter acquire [property belonging to Mexicans not established in

376. Beard v. Federy, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 478, 492 (1865). See also Leese v. Clark, 20 Cal. 387,
424 (1862) (if confirmed land grants were not conclusive against adverse parties, patent would
become "a source of perpetual and ruinous litigation").
377. § 15, 9 Stat. 631, 634.
378. See Beard, 70 U.S. at 493 ("The term 'third persons' . . . does not embrace all persons
other than the United States and the claimants, but only those who hold superior titles, such as
will enable them to resist successfully any action of the government in disposing of the property");
More v. Steinbach, 127 U.S. 70 (1887); Interstate Land Co. v. Maxwell Land-Grant Co., 139 U.S.
569, 580 (1891) ("And the only way that that grant can be defeated now is to show that the lands
embraced in it had been previously granted by the Mexican government to some other person.").
379. Barker v. Harvey, 181 U.S. 481 (1901) (confirmed land claim sustained against collateral
attack by Mission Indians in California ). See supra part IV.A.2.c.
380. Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Properties, 644 P.2d 792, 802-03 (Cal. 1982) (Richardson,
J., dissenting) (excluding state from definition of "third parties"), rev'd on other grounds, Summa
Corp. v. California, 466 U.S. 198 (1984). See also Knight v. United States Land Assoc., 142 U.S.
161, 185-86 (1891); People v. San Francisco, 17 P. 522 (Cal. 1888).
From the perspective of Indian tribes and states, this created an incongruous situation. For the
purpose of invalidating title, certain Indian and state claims were considered to be derived from
the Spanish or Mexican government and therefore subject to abandonment unless presented to the
California Land Claims Commission for adjudication during a two-year window of time. See supra
note 378. On the other hand, for purposes of challenging the title of others, those same Indian
and state parties were not regarded as claimants under prior Spanish and Mexican land grants. See
supra note 172.
381. See Beard v. Federy, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 478, 492 (1865) (confirmed land grant conclusive
against the government and "equally conclusive against parties claiming under the government by
title subsequent").
382. See Ely Real Estate & Investment Co. v. Watts, 262 F. 721 (9th Cir. 1920) (rejecting collateral
attack upon land grant confirmed by the Court of Private Land Claims); Russell v. Maxwell LandGrant Co., 158 U.S. 253 (1895) (rejecting collateral attack upon land grant confirmed by Congress).
383. Treaty with the Republic of Mexico, Feb. 2, 1848, U.S.-Mex., art. VIII, 9 Stat. 922, 929.
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the territory ceded to the United States] by contract, shall enjoy with
if the same belonged to
respect to it, guaranties equally
4 ample as
citizens of the United States.1

When resolving challenges to land grants brought under state law theories,
3 85 In
courts tend to rely upon this latter language of equal protection.
so doing, they emphasize the traditional deference given to states in
matters regarding real property. In Montoya v. Gonzales, Justice Holmes
approved the application of a New Mexican statute of limitation to a
Mexican land grant confirmed as perfect by the Court of Private Land
Claims.3 86 Under that statute, defendants gained title to the entire land
grant through the possession of a portion of the grant for a period of
ten years-a limitation period shorter than that applicable to other property.187 The Court held that the statute did not deny equal protection of
the law, "even if it should be confined to Spanish and Mexican grants"
because "there very well may have been grounds for the discrimination
in the history of those grants and the greater probability of an attempt
to revive stale claims. 3 88 As the lower court had explained,
[T]he [New Mexico statute] was not intended to be a statute of
limitation and repose merely, but was also intended to grant affirmative
relief by way of conferring title upon the pioneer agricultural settlers
as a reward of honest toil and diligence, indicating good faith in the
settlement and improvement of what was at that time a comparatively
barren and sparsely settled section, as, indeed, the whole territory

was at that time, for that matter.38 9

The equal protection rationale of Montoya v. Unknown Heirs of Vigil
was applied in several lower court decisions. In one case, the Fifth Circuit
articulated clearly a rationale for the application of state statutes of
limitations to the holders of confirmed land grants:
We regard the phrase [inviolably respected] as a covenant on the part
of the United States to respect from thenceforth any title that Mexicans
then had, or might thereafter acquire, to property within the region,
but not that it would guarantee that those Mexicans would never lose

384. 9 Stat. 929-30 (emphasis added).
385. See Amaya v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 158 F.2d 554, 558 (5th Cir.) (fundamental purpose
of article VIII was "to secure Mexicans in their title and to guarantee to them in that respect the
same protection of law that it extended to the citizens of the United States"), cert. denied, 331
U.S. 808 (1947).
386. 232 U.S. 375, 376-77 (1914). The statute in issue had been enacted by the Territory of New
Mexico, prior to statehood. Id.
387. Under the relevant legislation, "possession for ten years, under a deed purporting to convey
a fee simple, of any lands which have been granted by Spain, Mexico or the United States, gives
a title in fee to the quantity of land specified in the deed, if during the ten years no claim by
suit in law or equity effectually prosecuted shall have been set up." Id. at 377.
388. Id. at 378-79. Cf. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 669 (1979) (striking down state regulation that was often-discriminatory against
Indian tribes).
389. Montoya v. Unknown Heirs of Vigil, 16 N.M. 349, 378 120 P. 676, 686 (1912).
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their title to persons by foreclosure, sales under execution, trespasses,
adverse possession, and other nongovernmental acts. 390
Similarly, another court has held that Spanish and Mexican grantees may
lose title to grant lands through non-use and laches, even if such lands
had been fraudulently withheld from their rightful owners.3 9 Together,
these decisions indicate a policy quite different from that applied to
Native Americans, under which tribal lands generally cannot be lost
through non-use.392
B.

Continuing Protection of Indian Lands
Unlike the case of Hispanic grantees, time generally works in the tribes'

favor. 393 Special legal concepts protect Indian lands from loss due to
non-use. At the same time, tribes are able to take advantage of the nonuse of others, gaining important access rights under state statutes of
limitation and adverse possession laws. 94
This protection of tribal lands has two separate, but interrelated, legal
bases. First, under the sovereignty doctrine, tribes are treated as governments and therefore cannot be divested of unused property solely

through the operation of state law.

95

The Court has said that "sovereign

power, even when unexercised, is an enduring presence . . . and will
remain intact unless surrendered in unmistakable terms. 3 96 Second, the
Court's reluctance to allow loss of tribal powers through non-use is also

390. Amaya v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 158 F.2d 554, 558 (5th Cir. 1947) (affirming judgment
that claim to oil lands under a Spanish land grant had been lost through the adverse possession
of others).
391. Gonzales v. Yturria Land & Livestock Co., 72 F. Supp. 280, 282 (S.D. Tex. 1947) (holding
that allegations of fraud should not be considered after the expiration of the longest state period
of limitation).
392. See infra part VII.B.
393. See WILKINSON, supra note 20, at 53:
The tribes, then, have sought and obtained a substantial measure of insulation from
many of the negative effects of the passage of time. Concurrently, however, they
have attempted to make time work in their favor by seeking to establish a vigorous,
modern tribal sovereignty with actual powers far beyond those exercised at the time
of the treaties and treaty substitutes.
394. See supra part V.C.
395. See WILKINSON, supra note 20, at 44 (discussing the Supreme Court's "extreme reluctance
to allow settled expectations, even over lengthy periods of time, to deny tribal prerogatives"). The
sovereignty doctrine recognizes Indian tribes as governmental entities. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (establishing the foundation of the sovereignty doctrine through its holding
that the state of Georgia has no jurisdiction in Cherokee country); see also Collins, supra note 2,
§ 57.11(a)(1), at 293 ("parties to early treaties between the United States and the Indian nations
intended that tribes continue to exercise internal sovereignty over land reserved to them except for
limited federal jurisdiction over interracial matters). Although the sovereignty doctrine protects tribes
from certain state actions, it provides no such protection from federal intrusions. See id. § 57.04(d),
at 241 ("The Supreme Court has consistently sustained federal legislative power to override Indian
treaty rights and to restrict tribal sovereignty").
396. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982) (tribal taxing power applies to oil
and gas leases executed at a time when tribe was not exercising its sovereign taxing authority). See
also Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963) (undecreed tribal reserved water rights not
lost through non-use); Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n,
443 U.S. 658 (1979) (allocating to tribe approximately 50% of harvestable salmon fishery, despite
historic non-use of entire share).
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based upon the practical observation that non-use often resulted from
factors beyond tribal control:
The State questions the existence of any inherent tribal powers in this
case. It argues that the Tribe could not have exclusive rights in any
traditional territory because, in effect, there is no traditional territory:
"the Mescaleros were being swept from their lands by a tide of white
settlers." If we were to accept the State's argument, we would be
enshrining the rather perverse notion that traditional rights are not
to be protected in precisely those instances when protection is essential,
has succeeded in temporarily frustrating
i.e., when a dominant group
exercise of those rights.3 97
Judgments such as this establish the principle that the occupation of
Indian lands by force should not be condoned or rewarded by the law.
Beyond this protection of tribal lands from involuntary loss through
non-use, federal law imposes restraints on the tribes' intentional conveyance of their own property. These restraints on alienation can be
traced generally to the discovery rule, an understanding among European
nations that the first sovereign to "discover" lands in the New World
acquired the exclusive right to acquire title from the Indians occupying
such lands.3 98 This rule was intended, in part, to promote the orderly
settlement of the new territories and to prevent overreaching by the states
was codified
or individuals. 399 This policy of federal restraints on alienation
40
into law, beginning with the Nonintercourse Act of 1790. 0 As a result,
only the federal government can extinguish title to Indian lands. Even
voluntary sales to the states or private individuals, without federal approval, are void. 401 The Nonintercourse Act has been the basis of an
extraordinary series of lawsuits in the eastern states under which tribal

397. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, 630 F.2d 724, 730 (10th Cir. 1980) (tribal hunting
and fishing regulatory authority over non-Indians not lost through non-use), vacated, 450 U.S. 1036
(1981), original opinion reinstated, 677 F.2d 55 (1982), aff'd, 462 U.S. 324 (1983). Professor Wilkinson
observes that judicial reluctance to penalize tribes for non-use can also be explained by another
pragmatic concern, that "the exercise of long-dormant governmental and economic powers is their
best hope for breaking the cycle of a gripping poverty that has debilitated Indians since the reservation
system was established." WILKINSON supra note 20, at 44.
398. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 542-45 (1832).
399. The motivation behind the enactment of the Nonintercourse Acts was not entirely altruistic.
See United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 441 (1926) (Nonintercouse Acts protect tribes from
"improvidently disposing of their lands and becoming homeless public charges"); Collins, supra
note 2, § 57.04(a), at 232 (although the discovery rule helped to promote the policy that Indian
land should be honorably bought, it also provided to the sovereign "a convenient way to reward
favorites or to resell land at a profit").
400. Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 177). The
Act prohibited tribes from selling their lands unless the sale was "made and duly executed at some
public treaty[] held under the authority of the United States." 1 Stat. 329, 330-31, § 8. See generally
F. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS: THE INDIAN TRADE AND INTERCOURSE

ACTS, 1790-1834 (1962); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. at 231-32 (discussing
the Nonintercourse Acts' restraint on the alienation of Indian land); DESKBOOK, supra note 64, at
10-15.
401. See Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653 (1979) (Indian title or right of occupancy
"was recognized and extinguishable only by agreement with the tribe with the consent of the United
States").
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title has been recognized after more than a century of non-use. °2 In
County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation,4 3 the Court found that a
1795 agreement in which the Oneida Nation conveyed approximately
100,000 acres to the State of New York was void for lack of federal
approval. 4 4 Although the Oneidas failed to challenge the transaction for
some 175 years-during which time good-faith, non-Indian purchasers
had settled the land-the tribal claim was not barred by any state statute
of limitations.
Despite the fact that Indian lands are protected by legal theories not
applicable to Hispanic lands, such protection is far from perfect. In
many cases, protection was after the fact, resulting in monetary settlements, but rarely resulting in the restoration of lands to the tribes. 4 5 In
other instances, the federal government lacked the will or the authority
to protect the tribes from state and private interference. 40 6 In still other
cases, it was the federal government itself that was the Indian's worst
enemy. Despite tribal reliance on federal protection, at times "Congress
...
chose to exert its overriding military and legal authority and departed
from that promise [of protection], forcing many tribes to accept successive
treaties and agreements." 0 7
VIII.

CONCLUSION

In the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and in numerous Indian treaties,
the United States promised to respect property rights of the conquered.
To make such promises during the nation's idealistic youth or during its
feverish expansion across a seemingly-unlimited continent is one thing;
to keep them is quite another. A nation's character is tested severely by
the arduous process of implementing treaty promises-a process measured
in centuries, not years.
It is difficult to generalize accurately about such a lengthy process.
Nevertheless, the cases and legislation analyzed in this article support
several broad observations. With respect to the Treaty of Guadalupe

402. See generally
QUODDY

AND

PAUL BRODEUR, RESTITUTION: THE LAND
PENOBSCOT INDIANS OF NEW ENGLAND (1985);

CLAIMS OF THE MASHPEE,

PASSAMA-

Robert N. Clinton & Margaret T.
Hotopp, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Restraint on Alienation of Indian Land: The Origins
of the Eastern Land Claims, 31 ME. L. REV. 17 (1979).
403. 470 U.S. 226 (1985).
404. Several lower court decisions prior to Oneida had held that Indian land claims were not
barred by state doctrines such as laches, adverse possession, and statutes of limitation. See Mohegan
Tribe v. Connecticut, 638 F.2d 612, 614-15 n.3 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 968 (1981);
Narragansett Tribe of Indians v. Southern Rhode Island Land Dev. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 798, 804
(D.R.I. 1976); Schaghticoke Tribe of Indians v. Kent School Corp., 423 F. Supp. 780, 784-85 (D.
Conn. 1976). But see South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, 476 U.S. 498 (1986) (state statute
of limitation applies to Indians whose tribal existence had been "terminated" by federal legislation).
405. See supra note 80.
406. See Collins, supra note 2, § 57.04(b), at 234-35. See also Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida, 64 LW 4167 (Mar. 27, 1996) (Congress' attempt through the 1988 Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act to permit Indian Tribes to sue states for failure to negotiate in good faith over the operation
of gambling casinos on tribal land held unconstitutional).
407. WILKINSON, supra note 20, at 45.
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Hidalgo, the meaning of its simple promise to inviolably respect Mexican
property rights changed over time as Congress passed increasingly strict
legislation to implement the treaty. Thus, that guarantee might mean one
thing in California under the California Land Claims Settlement Act,
and another in New Mexico under subsequent legislation establishing the
Court of Private Land Claims.
Similarly, the effect of treaty guarantees to Indian tribes varied over
time, as Congress alternately favored assimilation and tribalism. It is
tempting to assert that tribal property rights received greater protection
than did Hispanic property rights, but that observation is riddled with
exceptions. It is true that special legal theories and legislation protected
Indian rights, including the federal trust duty, the canons of construction,
the non-intercourse statutes, and the legislation establishing the Indian
Claims Commission. But, it is equally true that Indian treaties were not
4 s
always ratified by Congress; 0 that the federal trust duty was also a
source of plenary power over tribal affairs; that the canons of construction
were applied sporadically; that Indians were generally unsuccessful in
maintaining rights to the lands and resources associated with watercourses;
and that at times tribal property rights were lost to Hispanic claims under
4°9
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
It is also true that the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo acted to minimize
the rights of Indian tribes located in the territory formerly governed by
Mexico. With respect to the Pueblo Indians in New Mexico, in 1877 the
United States Supreme Court determined that because the Pueblos had
previously been part of Mexico, they "[held] their lands by a right
superior to that of the United States" and were not entitled to special
41 0
Indian tribes.
protection under the general trust duty applicable to other
41
That position was later reversed in United States v. Sandoval. ' With
respect to the California Indians, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
established a special title litigation requirement not imposed upon other
Indian tribes. 412 Ironically, then, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo penalized tribes that had suffered multiple conquests-first by Spain and
to
Mexico, and later by the United States-by stripping them of rights
43
In
which they might otherwise be entitled under federal Indian policy.
particwere
retrospect, the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries
ularly troublesome times for the protection of treaty-based land rights.

408. Treaties were negotiated with California Indians in order to make land available to nonIndians for settlement and gold prospecting. The Indians had begun performance of their treaty
obligations when the United States rejected the treaties. Thus, "the tribes had surrendered their
homes with no place to go" and "the tribes became landless." COHEN, supra note 9, at 95.
409. See supra parts IV.A.2.c. and II1.B.
410. United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614, 618 (1877).
411. 231 U.S. 28 (1913). See supra part III.B.
412. See Barker v. Harvey, 181 U.S. 481 (1901). See supra part IV.A.2.c.
413. But see United States v. Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. 1301 (1986) (holding that the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo and the first amendment to the United States constitution protect Indians in
the free exercise of their religion and exempted Indian defendant from the prohibitions of the Bald
Eagle Protection Act).
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It was during that period that the courts and Congress determined that
the federal trust duty supported also a vast power over the tribes; 41 4 that
the Pueblos of New Mexico were not protected as wards of the nation; 415
that tribal common lands were "surplus" property available for sale to
non-Indians; 416 and that the Indian right of occupancy could be lost for

failure to comply with a federal two-year statute of limitation. 417 Rights
under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo experienced a similar contraction
during that period, as the Court established that even perfect land grants
were subject to statutory litigation requirements; 418 that the common lands
of community land grants passed to the United States' public domain; 41 9
and that title derived from the Spanish or Mexican governments might
constitutionally be subject to more stringent state statutes of limitation
420
than are applicable to other property.
The treaties considered here have no expiration date and their guarantees
remain alive in the hearts of Hispanic and Native American communities.
To this day, litigation over treaty-based land rights continues, providing
an ongoing opportunity for the United States to give meaning and respect
to the promises it made long ago.

414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.

See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S 375 (1886). See supra part IV.B.l.
See United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614 (1877). See supra part III.B.
See The General Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388. See supra part V.A.
See Barker v. Harvey, 181 U.S 963 (1900). See supra part IV.A.2.c.
See Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U.S. 238 (1889). See supra part IV.A.2.b.
See United States v. Sandoval, 167 U.S. 278 (1897). See supra part V.B.
Montoya v. Gonzales, 232 U.S. 375 (1914). See supra part VII.A.2.

